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COMMENT 
THE AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATION 
PROVISIONS: THE ASYMMETRY IN 
TREATMENT OF FORWARD AND REVERSE 
TRIANGULAR MERGERS AND OTHER 
PROBLEMS 
There is something wrong with provisions which 
remain so obscure, in spite of filigree detail in 
the statute and the regulations, that hardly any 
prediction as to their meaning can be made 
without the feeling that it is little better than a 
dignified guess.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A corporation is a separate entity which is required to file 
returns and pay income taxes in a way similar to that required 
of individual taxpayers.2 The gross income of both corporations 
and individuals is determined under Internal Revenue Code 
(hereinafter "the Code") Section 61.3 However, choosing to do 
business in the corporate form carries with it the disadvantage 
of incurring double taxation of distributed earnings.4 More 
specifically, a corporation must pay taxes not only on its own 
net income, but its shareholders must also pay tax on the dis-
tribution of the corporation's after-tax earnings.5 
1. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, Third Series 164 
(1940). 
2. See CEB, TAX PLANNING FOR S CORPORATIONS UNDER THE NEW RULES, 
program handbook at 8-9, January 1991. 
3. I.R.C. § 61. 
4. CEB, supra note 2, at 1. 
5. Id. at 8-9. 
541 
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One of the fundamental principles of tax law is that unre-
alized appreciation in the value of property should be taxed 
only when the property is sold or otherwise transferred.6 If 
there is an exchange of property for money or other property, a 
taxable event occurs if the property received materially diflfers 
from the property transferred.7 Recognizing that mere changes 
in the form of corporate holdings should not trigger the recog-
nition of unrealized gain, Congress enacted a statute in 1918 
which makes an exchange of stock or securities for other stock 
or securities tax-free if made in connection with a "reorganiza-
tion, merger or consolidation."8 
Today, special rules may apply when a corporation sells its 
assets, or when its shareholders exchange their stock for the 
stock of another corporation. Provided certain requirements 
are satisfied, the transaction can be accomplished tax-free to 
all the involved parties.9 Following the transaction, a selling 
shareholder's investment continues to be represented by shares 
of stock; however, such shares constitute interest in a different 
corporation. 1O Thus, a reorganization may provide the oppor-
tunity for a shareholder to change the substance of an invest-
ment in a tax-free manner.ll 
Unfortunately, the complex and varied reorganization 
definitions have proven to be a formidable barrier to achieving 
tax equipoise within the Code. The current reorganization 
principles vary from provision to provision, seemingly without 
rhyme or reason. 12 No sound tax policy justifies the disparate 
6. I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1960). 
8. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919). Tax Mgmt. 
(BNA) Portfolios, Corporate Acquisitions - (A), (B) and (C) Reorganizations, No. 
771 at A-47 (1994). 
9. [d. The Code provides generally for nonrecognition of gain or loss at both 
the shareholder level (§§ 354 and 356) and the corporate level (§ 361); any unrec-
ognized gain or loss is reflected in the substituted basis of qualifying property 
received by the shareholder (§ 362), and is preserved for recognition in a subse-
quent taxable disposition. P. WEIDENBRUCH, JR. AND K BURKE, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND STOCKHOLDERS, at 195 (3rd ed., 1989). 
10. CEB, supra note 2, at 90. 
11. [d. 
12. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION, at 233 (3rd 
ed., 1995). See infra Section III entitled "DISCUSSION: THE LACK OF A UNIFYING 
PRINCIPLE IN THE CURRENT AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATION DEFINITIONS" for ex-
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treatment of economically equivalent or near-equivalent corpo-
rate acquisition transactions. 13 While tax planning for reor-
ganizations has certainly become a more predictable endeavor 
in the past decade due to the plethora of illustrative Regula-
tions and Letter Rulings,14 a need for further clarification and 
unification of the Code remains. 15 
This comment will discuss the amalgamating reorganiza-
tions generally (types A through C as well as some D'S)16 and, 
specifically, triangular reorganizations.17 This comment will 
first provide an overview of the general requirements of the 
amalgamating reorganization provisions. It will then continue 
to the following topics: (1) a discussion of the Code's triangular 
reorganization provisions, giving attention to both forward and 
reverse triangular mergers;1S (2) an analysis of the asymme-
try in treatment of triangular mergers based on whether they 
take the form of a forward or reverse triangular merger; (3) an 
amples. 
13. See id. at 233-234. 
14. The tenn "letter ruling" is most commonly associated with the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Tax Code; in that context, a "letter ruling is "a written 
statement issued to a taxpayer or his authorized representative by the National 
Office which interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts." 26 
C.F.R. Section 601.201(a)(2) (1995). Although a letter ruling may be revoked or 
modified unless it is accompanied by a "closing agreement," see Rev. Proc. 95·1, 
Section 1.01, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 13, any "revocation or modification of a ruling will 
not be applied retroactively with respect to the taxpayer to whom the ruling was 
originally issued." 26 C.F.R. Section 601.201(1)(5) (1995). A ruling will not be ap-
plied retroactively against the taxpayer to whom the ruling was originally issued 
so long as: (i) there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts, (ii) 
the facts subsequently developed are not materially different from the facts on 
which the ruling was based, (iii) there has been no change in the applicable law, 
(iv) the ruling was issued with respect to a prospective or proposed transaction, 
and (v) the taxpayer directly involved in the ruling acted in good faith in reliance 
upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would be to his detriment." [d. 
15. See ABRAMS AND OOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 233-234. 
16. See infra notes 76-163 and accompanying text for a detialed discussion of 
the amalgamating reorganizations. 
17. "Triangular reorganizations" involve the use of a subsidiary to acquire the 
desired target corporation. 
18. A "forward" triangular merger entails a subsidiary corporation acquiring 
the target corporation in a statutory merger using the parent corporation's stock 
as consideration. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(O). A "reverse" triangular merger occurs 
when the parent corporation's controlled subsidiary merges into the target corpo-
ration; the acquired corporation survives, and its shareholders exchange controlling 
stock of the acquired corporation for voting stock of the acquiring parent corpora-
tion. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E). 
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exploration of the Congressional desire for tax-parity among 
the reorganization provisions and an assessment of whether 
the Service has been complying with legislative intent; and (4) 
a conclusion that, while the Internal Revenue Service (herein-
after "the Service") has made some positive changes towards 
the goals of clarification and unification of the Code, tax plan-
ners should continue to expect the unexpected. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A complex assortment of statutory provisions within the 
Code controls the federal income tax treatment of corporate 
reorganizations. The term "reorganization"19 is strictly limited 
to those transactions described in Section 368(a)(1) of the 
Code.20 Section 368 is a definitional section only; nowhere in 
Section 368 are the tax implications of a reorganization men-
tioned.21 However, Section 368 is important because many 
other sections are triggered by transactions meeting the defini-
tions contained in Section 368.22 
19. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(I) of the Code defines the term "reorganization" to 
include mergers, consolidations, recapitalizations, acquisitions by one corporation of 
the stock or assets of another corporation, and changes in form or place of organi-
zation. 
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a). See generally BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, (6th ed., 1994). 
21. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 209. 
22. [d. The reorganization and division provisions are contained in Subparts B, 
C, and D of Part III ("Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations") of Subchap-
ter C. These are labeled "Effects on shareholders and security holders," "Effects on 
corporations," and "Special rule; definitions." The Code sections are summarized 
here briefly: 
Subpart B 
Sections 354 and 355: nonrecognition at the 
shareholder and security holder level on re-
ceipt of qualifying consideration. 
Section 356: extent to which gain is recognized 
on receipt of additional consideration (boot). 
Section 357: assumption of liabilities. 
Section 358: shareholder and security holder 
substituted basis. 
Subpart C 
Section 361: nonrecognition exchanges at cor-
porate level. 
Section 362: corporate basis carryover. 
SUbpart D 
Section 368: definitions of exchanges classified 
4
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Section 368 divides reorganizations into four broad groups: 
(1) amalgamating reorganizations in which two or more corpo-
rations are combined into a single corporate structure; (2) 
divisive reorganizations in which a single corporation is divid-
ed into two or more companies; (3) single-party reorganizations 
in which one corporation undergoes a substantial change in 
financial structure, modifies its place of incorporation, or an-
other similar corporate characteristic; and (4) bankruptcy reor-
ganizations in which a financially distressed corporation seeks 
to improve its position.23 This comment focuses on the amal-
gamating reorganizations. 
A. AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATIONS: GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
To qualify for tax-free treatment, a transaction must first 
meet one of the definitions of a "reorganization." The term "re-
organization" is strictly limited to the specific transactions set 
forth in Section 368(a).24 Tax-free treatment of reorganiza-
as reorganizations. 
In addition to these sections the following play an integral role in corporate reor-
ganizations and divisions: 
Section 1032: nonrecognition for corporation on 
issuance of its own stock. 
Section 311: nonrecognition for corporation on dis-
tribution of its stock in a division. 
Sections 108, 269, 381, 382, and 383: survival and 
carryover of corporate tax attributes. 
Also, a brief survey of the Code sections should not ignore the requirements that 
have been imposed by the Treasury Department and by the courts. ROSE AND 
CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, at 580, (3rd ed., 1988). 
It should be noted that as a result of a reorganization, the acquiring corpo-
ration succeeds to a variety of tax attributes of the acquired corporation (See § 
381(a)(2) - this rule does not extend to a B reorganization, since the acquired 
corporation in that case remains in existence). Inchided among the various attrib-
utes that carry over to the acquiring corporation are the acquired corporation's 
earnings and profits, net operating loss carryovers, methods of computing deprecia-
tion, and method of accounting (See generally I.R.C. § 381(c)). CEB, supra note 2, 
at 101-102. 
23. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 209. In terms of I.R.C. § 368, 
the amalgamating reorganizations consist of types A through C as well as some 
D's; the divisive reorganizations include the remainder of the D's as well as trans-
actions described in § 355 though not falling within the definitions of I.R.C. § 
368(a)(I); the single party reorganizations are the types E and F; and the bank-
ruptcy reorganization is the G. [d. 
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2. CEB, supra note 2, at 91. 
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tions is premised upon the notion of "continuity of investment;" 
investors are viewed as preserving their interest in a business 
enterprise through continuing stock ownership, notwithstand-
ing the change in corporate form. 25 To protect this notion, 
courts have developed a variety of doctrines to ensure that 
transactions literally meeting the statutory definitions are 
genuinely entitled to nonrecognition treatment. 26 Included 
among these doctrines are (1) continuity of proprietary inter-
est, (2) continuity of business enterprise, (3) business purpose, 
and (4) step transaction. 27 
1. Continuity of Proprietary Interest Doctrine 
The one unifying aspect of statutory reorganizations is 
that of "continuity of interest. ,,28 The continuity of proprietary 
interest doctrine requires that the shareholders of the acquired 
corporation have received stock representing a substantial 
proprietary stake in the acquiring corporation.29 The purpose 
of this doctrine is to deny nonrecognition when the sharehold-
ers have in substance "cashed out" their investment. 30 Thus, 
early reorganization cases frequently hinged upon the issue of 
whether there was, in substance, a sale, or whether the share-
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b); See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, 130 
F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1942). The rationale for tax-free treatment of such organizations 
is the same as that for § 351 incorporations: not enough is changed by the trans-
action to warrant immediate imposition of tax. See BITI'KER AND EUSTICE, infra 
note 26, at 12-10, 12-11. The litigation in this area has often involved whether the 
lines drawn in § 368 properly distinguish mere changes in form not warranting 
taxation and other rearrangements that are fully taxable. See id. 
26. See BORIS I. BITI'KER AND JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, at 12-24, 12-25 (6th ed., 1994). 
27. [d. 
2B. For recent cases involving the continuity of proprietary interest doctrine, 
see, e.g., Seagram Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. No.4, 95 TNT 16-11 (1995) 
(rejecting the argument that a pre-acquisition cash purchase of target shares by a 
corporation unrelated to the acquiring corporation would destroy continuity of in-
terest in an otherwise valid reorganization); Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
104 T.C. No.5 (1995); Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
29. See, e.g., Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 
1932) (transfer of assets for cash and short-term notes constituted a sale, not a 
reorganization); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1960). 
30. CEB, supra note 2, at 91. Note, this doctrine is embodied in the statutory 
definitions of Band C reorganizations which require the use of voting stock con-
sideration. Sections 36B(a)(1)(B) and (C). 
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holders maintained a continuity of interest in the post-acquisi-
tion corporation.31 
In Helvering v. Minnesota Tea CO.,32 the Supreme Court 
upheld the tax-free status of a transfer of corporate assets in 
exchange for what amounted to $540,000 in stock and 
$425,000 in cash.33 Although the stock interest received by 
the shareholders of the transferor corporation left them with a 
minority interest in the ongoing venture,34 the Court conclud-
ed that the need for a continuing proprietary interest was 
satisfied because a "material part" of the consideration was an 
equity interest in the transferee.35 For ruling purposes, the 
Service has indicated that the continuity of interest require-
ment will be satisfied if there is stock ownership on the part of 
the former shareholders equal in value to at least 50% of all 
the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired corporation.36 
Moreover, if a sufficient percentage of stock is received, it does 
not matter that each shareholder receives a different percent-
age of stock and other consideration.37 
A more recent development regarding continuity of inter-
est was announced in Paulsen v. Commissioner.38 In Paulsen, 
the Supreme Court held that continuity of interest was lacking 
in a merger of two savings and loan associations39 where 
shareholders of the acquired corporation gave up their guaran-
ty stock in exchange for passbook accounts and certificates of 
31. See, e.g., Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940) (holding that a transfer 
of corporate assets in exchange for cash plus bonds payable over 11 years failed to 
be a tax-free reorganization); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage v. Commissioner, 287 
U.S. 462 (1933) (holding that a transfer of corporate assets in exchange for cash 
plus well-secured promissory notes payable in less than four months could not 
qualify as a reorganization). 
32. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935). 
33. Id. at 386. 
34. Their equity interest represented about 7.5% of the transferee's outstanding 
stock. See id. at 381-382. 
35. Id. at 386. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 211. 
36. Id. See Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114; Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 
568. But See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (holding that a 
rearrangement was a reorganization even though it resulted in less than 50% 
continuity of interest). 
37. See Rev. Rul. 66·224, 1966-2 C.B. 114. 
38. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985). 
39. One authorized to issue "guaranty stock" to its owners and the other hav-
ing no stock of any kind. Id. at 133 
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deposit in the surviving corporation.40 The result was reason-
able since the consideration could be viewed as a cash 
equivalent without significant equity features. 41 However, the 
taxpayers had argued that the continuity of interest test 
should focus on the nature of the consideration received rather 
than the relative change in proprietary interest.42 If this is 
the appropriate test, it is difficult to distinguish the Paulsen 
situation from a merger of two non-stock savings and loan 
associations, which has been held to constitute a tax-free reor-
ganization.43 Although, the Supreme Court addressed this 
point in its Paulsen opinion, the Court was sufficiently unclear 
as to leave some uncertainty concerning the appropriate stan-
dard." 
2. Continuity of Business Enterprise and Business Purpose 
Doctrines 
A reorganization requires the business enterprise of the 
acquired corporation to continue under the modified corporate 
form.45 Therefore, when a corporation reorganizes, but its core 
business continues to operate, only the corporate form has 
changed, and no taxable transaction has occurred.46 The "con-
tinuity of business enterprise" requirement is met if the ac-
quiring corporation either continues the transferor's historic 
business or continues to use a "significant portion" of the 
transferor's historic business assets in a different business.47 
40. ld. at 134-135. 
41. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 212-213. 
42. See Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 141. 
43. See Rev. Rul. 69-3, 1969-1 C.B. 103. P. WEIDENBRUCH, JR. AND K BURKE, 
supra note 9, at 19B. 
44. See Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 142; see also ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra 
note 12, at 213. The Paulsen Court gave a brief explanation involving a compari-
son of the equity interests received and those given up in the exchange. See 
Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 142. However, the Court's explanation did not address the 
taxpayers' argument - that the continuity of interest test turns on the nature of 
the consideration received and not on the relative change in proprietary-equity 
interest. See id. 
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(b) (1960); See also Pridemark, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). 
46. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 214. 
47. ld. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(d) (1960). The phrase "significant portion of 
[target's] historic business assets" is partially explained in Treasury Regulation § 
1.36B-1(d)(4)(iii): "In general, the determination of the portion of a corporation's 
8
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Distinct from the continuity of business enterprise doctrine 
is the business purpose doctrine. The business purpose doc-
trine does not recognize transactions that serve only the pur-
pose of avoiding taxes.4B Under the Regulations, the doctrine 
requires that the transactions ''be undertaken for reasons ger-
mane to the continuance of the business of a corporation."49 
3. Step Transaction Doctrine 
The step transaction doctrine is an extension of the tax 
principle that a transaction's substance, but not its form, deter-
mines tax consequences. 50 Attention is paid to the overall re-
sult of a series of interdependent transactions; the results of 
each transaction are not viewed in isolation. 51 A roundabout 
approach taken by a taxpayer to achieve a technically legiti-
mate result is ignored where the only purpose for the detour is 
tax avoidance. 52 The courts have long held the view that "[a] 
given result at the end of a straight path is not made a differ-
ent result because reached by following a devious path.,,53 
Unfortunately, the circumstances in which the step trans-
action doctrine is properly applicable have by no means been 
consistently delineated by the Service or the courts. 54 More-
over, even when there is agreement that a particular case 
assets considered 'significant' is based on the relative importance of the assets to 
operation of the business. However, all other facts and circumstances, such as the 
net fair market value of those assets, will be considered." [d. See Laure v. Com-
missioner, 653 F.2d 253 (1981). 
48. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (1960). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) and (c) 
(1960). 
50. See BITrKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-208, 12-209. 
51. See Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156 (incorporation of several subsidiaries 
under Section 351, a merger of an unrelated corporation into one of the subsidiar-
ies in a forward triangular merger, and a reincorporation of the parent under 
Section 368(aXIXF) were respected as separate steps where each transaction "is 
sufficiently meaningful on its own account, and is not dependent upon the other 
transaction for its substantiation."). 
52. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-209. 
53. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938); See generally 
Mintz and Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. TAX 
INST. 247 (1954). 
54. Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolios, Corporate Acquisitions - (A), (B) and (C) 
Reorganizations, No. 771 at A-63 (1994). 
9
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warrants a step transaction analysis, no universally accepted 
set of legal standards exists for applying the doctrine.55 
Courts have applied three alternative tests in determining 
whether to invoke the step transaction doctrine in a particular 
transaction: the "end result" test,56 the "mutual interdepen-
dence" test,57 and the "binding commitment,,58 test.59 Based 
on the Tax Court cases in the post-transaction continuity ar-
ea60 and the Service's stance on this issue,61 the mutual in-
terdependence test is most commonly applied.62 
Step transaction issues may overlap with continuity of 
interest issues in a variety of ways. For example, an interest-
ing step transaction problem involves whether planned post-
merger sales of the surviving corporation stock by former 
55. Id. 
56. Under this, the most liberal test, the step transaction doctrine will be in-
voked if it appears that a series of formally separate steps are in fact prearranged 
parts of a single transaction intended from the beginning to arrive at the ultimate 
result. Id. at A-64. See Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987); See 
also Christian Est. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. 1231, 1239 (1989). The end result 
test is based upon the actual intent of the taxpayers, although the results desired 
by the parties are often difficult to ascertain. See id. 
57. The mutual interdependence test focuses on whether "the steps are so 
interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been 
fruitless without a completion of the series." Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 
1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 913. See also Kass v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), affd without published opinion, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 
1974); Farr v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 350 (1955); American Wire Fabrics Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 607 (1951); American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 
T.C. 397 (1948), affd 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949). BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, 
at A-64 and n. 770. 
58. The narrowest alternative for applying the step transaction doctrine, the 
binding commitment test forbids use of the doctrine unless, at the time the first 
step is commenced, there is a binding agreement to take a later step. BNA, No. 
771, supra note 54, at A-64. See Redding, 630 F.2d at 1178; Commissioner v. 
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). The binding commitment test is generally de-
signed for the characterization of steps which span several tax years and are "not 
only indeterminable but unfixed for an indefinite and unlimited period in the fu-
ture, awaiting events that might or might not happen." McDonald's Restaurants of 
11. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1982), citing Commissioner v. 
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-64. 
59. Id. at A-63. 
60. See, e.g., Christian Est., 57 T.C.M at 1231; Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1415. 
61. See Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156 <substance of each of a series of 
independent steps will be recognized, and step transaction doctrine not applied if 
step has independent economic significance, is not a sham, and was undertaken 
for a valid business purpose). 
62. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-63. 
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transferor corporation shareholders cause the transaction to 
lose its reorganization status.63 Corporate tax professors 
Howard E. Abrams and Richard L. Doernberg considered both 
sides of this issue: 
If so, such sales will affect the other 
shareholders who choose to continue to hold 
their investment in the surviving corporation as 
well the acquiring corporation whose basis var-
ies depending on whether the transaction quali-
fies as a reorganization. If not, then the empty 
formalism of issuing registered shares in a 
merger involving a publicly-held corporation will 
eviscerate the continuity of proprietary interest 
doctrine.54 
Therefore, absent a binding commitment to dispose of the 
shares, even a prompt post-merger disposition should not 
break. continuity,65 so long as the former transferor corpora-
tion shareholders are "at risk" with respect to the acquiring 
corporation's shares and have the option to retain such 
shares.66 
However, it is possible that a court may accept a broader 
interpretation of the step transaction doctrine, as did the Sev-
enth Circuit in the controversial of McDonald's Restaurants of 
Illinois v. Commissioner. 67 In McDonald's, companies of a 
franchise group were merged into McDonald's Corporation.68 
Seven months later, the former shareholders of the acquired 
companies sold the McDonald's stock they had received in the 
merger.69 The taxpayers, subsidiaries of McDonald's to which 
63. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 213-214. 
64. [d. at 214. Howard E. Abrams and Richard L. Doernberg are professors at 
Emory University. 
65. Herbert N. Beller, Final Regulations Ease Planning for Tax-Free Reverse 
Subsidiary Mergers, 64 J.TAX'N 80 (Feb. 1986). If post-merger sales have an ad-
verse effect on the non-selling shareholders, then the tax implications of a corpo-
rate rearrangement cannot be determined with certainty until well after the trans-
action. In addition, it may be impossible to determine which shareholders sell 
their shares and when they do so. 
66. [d. 
67. McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 520. See generally P. Faber, The Use and Misuse 
of the Plan of Reorganization Concept, 38 TAX L. REV. 515 (1983). 
68. [d. at 522. 
69. [d. 
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the assets of the franchise companies had been transferred 
after the merger, argued that the step transaction doctrine 
should apply to disqualify the transaction as a tax-free reorga-
nization.70 The taxpayers claimed that McDonald's merger, 
followed by a sale of stock, violated the continuity of interest 
requirement. 71 Therefore, contended that the assets should 
hold a sterred-up basis rather than a carry-over basis.72 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the taxpayers and held 
that the step transaction doctrine was applicable because ulti-
mate sale of the stock received by the former shareholders of 
the acquired companies was an integral part of the transac-
tion.73 Thus, McDonald's shows that no definitive judicial ap-
plication of the step transaction doctrine exists74 and that the 
tax fate of certain transactions may turn on a particular 
court's unique interpretation of the doctrine on a case-by-case 
basis.75 
B. REQllREMENTS OF "A" THROUGH "D" AMALGAMATING 
REORGANIZATIONS 
Under Section 368, tax-free amalgamating reorganizations 
are designated by four subtypes: A, B, C or D.76 Generally 
speaking, these reorganizations are different methods of com-
bining two or more corporations by tax-free means.77 A typical 
"A" reorganization involves one corporation acquiring the as-
sets of another corporation, in exchange for stock of the acquir-
70. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522-524. 
71. See id. at 524; see also ROSE AND CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, at 
596 (3rd ed., 1988). 
72. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522. 
73. See id. at 524. In Robert A Penrod, 88 T.C. 1415, 1437 (1987), the Tax 
Court held that the exchange of stock of corporations that operated fast-food res-
taurants under McDonald's franchises for stock of McDonald's Corporation qualified 
as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A) even though the taxpayers sold the 
McDonald's stock eight months after acquiring it due to events that occurred after 
the stock was acquired. Hence, the acquisition of the stock and its subsequent sale 
were not transactions that should be stepped together. [d. 
74. See generally BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-63, A-64. 
75. See id. 
76. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 209. 
77. See id. 
12
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ing corporation plus additional consideration.78 The Code de-
fines a "B" reorganization as the acquisition of stock of one 
corporation in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquiring 
corporation or its parent.79 In a "C" reorganization, one corpo-
ration acquires "substantially all" of the assets of another cor-
poration in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring corpora-
tion or its parent.80 Finally, a non-divisive "D" reorganization 
requires that one corporation transfer all or part of its assets 
to another "controlled" corporation, and that the transferor 
then distribute stock or securities of the controlled corpora-
tion.81 While in many instances the choice of one or another 
may be simply a matter of convenience, there are qualifying 
differences that may dictate the most advantageous technique 
for a given situation.82 Moreover, tax considerations may not 
be the over-riding factors when structuring these transac-
tions.83 
1. "A" Reorganizations 
An "A" reorganization is defined as a statutory merger or 
consolidation.84 Every state statutorily provides for mergers 
and consolidations.85 A statutory merger is the most flexible 
78. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A). 
79. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). 
80. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C). 
81. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(0). 
82. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26; at 12-21, 12-22 and 12-42; see 
also ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 233. For example, permissible 
consideration in A reorganizations and in forward triangular mergers is limited 
only by common law, whereas the only allowable consideration in B reorganiza-
tions and reverse triangular mergers (at least 80%) is voting stock. Id. In between 
these opposites lies the C reorganizations, which allow up to 20% boot. Id. 
83. Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolios, Structuring Corporate Acquisitions - Tax As· 
peets, No. 770 at A-144 (1993). 
84. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(A). "Statutory" for this purpose refers to applicable 
state law. In a merger, one corporation absorbs the corporate enterprise of another 
corporation. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-41. Consolidations involve 
the combination of two or more corporations into a newly created entity. Id. Merg. 
ers are much more common than consolidations, since it is generally desirable for 
one of the combining corporations to survive the transaction, particularly where 
one of the corporations owns assets with restriction, or assignment. BNA, No. 771, 
supra note 54, at A-6. The creation of a new corporation in a consolidation may 
add to the necessity or expense of qualifying to do business or exchanging shares 
of the surviving corporation. Id. A consolidation is most useful where the combin-
ing corporations desire a new state of incorporation. Id. 
85. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 
13
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form of the tax-free reorganizations86 but generally requires 
shareholder approva1.87 Mer approval, the assets and liabili-
ties of the acquired corporation pass to the acquiring corpora-
tion by operation of law and the acquired corporation disap-
pears as a separate legal entity. 88 
The Code does not specifically prescribe the consideration 
that can be paid by the acquiring corporation in a merger, as it 
does in a B or C reorganization.89 Voting stock, nonvoting 
stock, debt securities, cash, or other property may be used 
without disqualifying the transaction as a tax-free reorgani-
zation.90 "Substantially all" of the transferor corporation's as-
sets need not be acquired, as in a C reorganization.91 The 
transferor corporation may dispose of assets which the trans-
feree corporation does not want prior to the transaction.92 In 
addition, a no "control" requirement exists.93 However, courts 
have interpreted the continuity of interest doctrine to require 
that stock of the acquiring corporation comprise a substantial 
part of the consideration.94 Under the current guidelines of 
251(a)(1953): 
Id. 
Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws 
of this State may merge into a single corporation, 
which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations 
or may consolidate into a new corporation formed 
by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of 
merger or consolidation, as the case may be, comply-
ing and approved in accordance with this section. 
86. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-42. For example, unlike 
the types Band C reorganizations, the type A reorganization imposes no re-
strictions on the kind of consideration to be used in a statutory merger or consoli-
dation.Id. 
87. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 1988). 
88. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107 (West 1988). 
89. See BITI'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-42. 
90. Jack F. Thome, Mergers of Corporations Can Take Various Forms Each 
With Its Own Tax Consequences, TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS, 35 T.A 38 (July 
1985). 
91. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-42. Thus, for example, an 
A reorganization is generally the preferred vehicle where target has distributed 
unwanted assets prior to the reorganization by means of a spin-off or redemption. 
BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6. 
92. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-47. 
93. See id. at 12-42. For example, in a B reorganization, "control" means own-
ership of at least 80% of the total combined voting power of voting stock and at 
least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock. See I.R.C. § 
368(c). 
94. See, e.g., Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th 
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the Service, a favorable ruling that a merger qualifies as an A 
reorganization requires that the shareholders of the acquired 
corporation receive at least 50% equity consideration.95 
The principal disadvantages of an A reorganization are the 
often burdensome requirements of meeting securities laws, 
preparation of numerous documents, and providing the approv-
al and appraisal rights to acquirer shareholders as mandated 
under applicable state law.96 In addition, because the target 
corporation's assets and liabilities transfer to the acquiring 
corporation by operation of law, the acquiring corporation can-
not choose which of the target's liabilities it will assume.97 
2. "B" Reorganizations 
A "B" reorganization is defined as the acquisition of stock 
of one corporation in exchange "solely" for all or part of the 
voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent,98 but 
not both,99 provided the acquiring corporation is in control of 
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951). 
95. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. But see John A. Nelson Co. v. 
Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (38%); Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415 (1936) 
(25%). 
96. Thorne, supra note 90, at 38. 
97. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6, A-7. 
98. "Parent" is the purchasing or acquiring corporation which desires to make 
an acquisition, either directly or through its subsidiary. 
99. In a standard B reorganization, stock of the parent corporation or of its 
subsidiary may be used, but not both. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c). This limitation 
is intended to ensure that a shareholder of the target corporation cannot cash out 
part of her investment without losing a proportionate share of her interest in the 
transferred assets. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 217, stating: 
[d. 
For example, suppose that A Corp acquired all the 
stock of T Corp in exchange for its own stock as 
well as stock of its parent. If a (former) share-
holder of T Corp sold the stock of A's parent, the 
shareholder would obtain cash from the transaction 
without substantially diluting his interest in A (and 
through A, in T). 
Were such transactions permitted, the force of the "solely voting stock to 
acquire control" requirement of the B reorganization would be reduced. [d. Al-
though beyond the scope of this discussion, one may want to reconsider this point 
in the context of divisive reorganizations because the effect of using stock of both 
the parent and its subsidiary in a standard B reorganization could be to turn the 
B into a divisive reorganization. [d. at 217-218. 
15
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the acquired corporation immediately after the transaction. 100 
"Control" requires the possession of stock representing at least 
80% of both the total combined voting power of all the acquired 
corporation's voting stock and the total number of shares of all 
other classes of the corporation's stock. 101 
An "acquisition" may consist of a series of acquisitions that 
are part of the same transaction. 102 Generally, aggregation is 
permitted for acquisitions "taking place over a relatively short 
period of time such as 12 months.,,103 Although aggregation 
may allow earlier acquisitions to qualify for nonrecognition 
treatment even though control did not exist after such earlier 
acquisitions,104 it may also serve to disqualify the whole se-
ries of acquisitions if any of them involved any consideration 
other than voting stock. 105 If the earlier stock purchase were 
unrelated or sufficiently remote in time,106 however, it would 
not violate the "solely for voting stock" requirement of Section 
368(a)(1)(B).107 
The "solely for voting stock" requirement has been strictly 
applied by the Service and the courtS. 108 Even if the acquiring 
corporation acquired more than 80% of the acquired 
corporation's stock in exchange for its voting stock, the entire 
transaction is taxable if it acquired any stock for nonvoting 
stock consideration109 as part of the same acquisition. no A 
100. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(B). CEB, supra note 2, at 94. 
101. I.R.C. Section 368(c). The relevant question is whether the acquiring corpo-
ration is in control immediately after the acquisition, and not whether control 
existed before, or as a result of, the acquisition. I.R.C. Section 368(aX1)(B) (last 
parenthetical); Reg, § 1.368-2(c). CEB, supra note 2, at 94. 
102. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-53. 
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c). 
104. Referred to as a "creeping" B reorganization. 
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c). CEB, supra note 2, at 94. 
106. Often referred to as being "old and cold." 
107. See Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 861-862 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(holding that however much stock of the target corporation is acquired in the 
transaction, the total consideration furnished by the acquiring corporation must be 
its voting stock or voting stock of its parent). However, the court reasoned that 
"old and cold" stock need not have been acquired solely for voting stock. [d. at 
862, 875. 
108. [d. See also Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 
(1942). The voting stock may be common or preferred, or both. Rev Proc. 77-37, 
1977-2 C.B. 568. 
109. Cash, for example, may constitute nonvoting stock consideration. 
110. Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/4
1996] AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATIONS 557 
limited exception to the "no boot in a B"lll rule allows an ac-
quiring corporation to pay cash in lieu of fractional shares of 
stock. u2 
Although a B reorganization requires absolute compliance 
with the "solely for voting stock" requirement, there is no re-
quirement that the target corporation hold substantially all of 
its historic assets following the acquisition.u3 Thus, a B reor-
ganization provides flexibility in acquiring a target corporation 
that, prior to the acquisition, has distributed unwanted assets 
to its shareholders. 114 In addition, because a B reorganization 
constitutes an acquisition of stock of the target, the liabilities 
of the target do not become liabilities of the acquiring corpora-
tion as they would in an A reorganization or possibly a C reor-
ganization. U5 
3. "C" Reorganizations 
The "C" reorganization more closely resembles the A reor-
ganization than the B reorganization does because the C reor-
ganization contemplates a transfer of assetsU6 rather than a 
transfer of stock.117 The C reorganization is defined as the 
acquisition by one corporation of "substantially all" the proper-
ties of another corporation in exchange solely for voting stock 
of the acquiring corporation or its parent, but not both.uB The 
Dailey, The Voting Stock Requirement of B and C Reorganizations, 26 TAX L. REv. 
725 (1971). 
Ill. The tenn "boot" is not defined in the Code. Boot refers to cash or other 
nonpennitted property that triggers recognition when received in an otherwise tax-
free exchange. See BITI'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 11-53, 11-54. For ex-
ample, boot may refer to consideration such as nonvoting stock, debt securities, 
cash or other property. [d. 
112. Rev. Rul. 66-365, 1966-2 C.B. 116. CEB, supra note 2, at 95. 
113. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-3S. 
114. [d. Also, the absence of the "substantially all" requirement adds flexibility 
in post-acquisition restructuring. [d. 
115. This difference is due to the fact that the target corporation remains as 
the subSidiary of the acquiring parent corporation. [d. See infra notes 117-144 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of C reorganizations. 
116. As in a merger. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 21S. 
117. As in a B reorganization. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 21S. 
In fact, the C reorganization is so similar to the A reorganization that it often is 
called the "de facto" (or practical) merger provision. [d. 
l1S. I.R.C. Section 36S(aXIXC). It should be noted, however, that if SO% of the 
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Service has ruled that the transfer constituting 90% of the 
target's net assets and 70% of the target's gross assets will 
constitute "substantially all.,,1l9 Generally, the acquired cor-
poration must liquidate following the transaction. 120 
As in a B reorganization, the statute ensures continuity of 
proprietary interest in a C reorganization by limiting the con-
sideration that can be used by the acquiring corporation to 
voting stoCk. 121 However, in contrast to the strict application 
of the "solely for voting stock" requirement of B reorganiza-
tions, some leeway is provided the acquiring corporation in a C 
reorganization through two provisions: Section 368(a)(1)(C) 
(final clause) and Section 368(a)(2)(B).122 
The final clause in Section 368(a)(1)(C) provides that as-
sumption by the acquiring corporation of debts of the target 
corporation does not constitute impermissible consideration in 
determining qualification as a C reorganization. 123 This final 
clause provision overturns the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Hendler,124 which had held that assumption 
of a liability, even in the context of a bulk transfer of corporate 
assets, should be treated as the equivalent of cash consider-
ation. 125 Because most companies are forced to mortgage 
their fixed or working assets to obtain commercial credit, con-
tinuation of the Hendler doctrine would have had the effect of 
rendering the C reorganization commercially unavailable. 126 
Section 368(a)(2)(B), the ''boot relaxation rule,,,127 permits 
target's assets are exchanged for voting stock of the acquiring corporation or of its 
parent, use of the other's stock may be permissible under the boot relaxation rule 
of I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B). 
119. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. 
120. This liquidation requirement can be avoided only with the permission of 
the Secretary of the Treasury. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(G)(ii). 
121. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 218; see also BITIKER AND 
EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-69, 12-70. 
122. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 218. 
123. See id at 219. 
124. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938). 
125. See id. at 566-567. 
126. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 219. 
127. Under the "boot relaxation rule" of I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(B), up to 20 
percent of the consideration can consist of property other than stock of a party to 
the reorganization, although the 20 percent limitation is reduced by the amount of 
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the acquiring corporation to use cash or other booe28 as con-
sideration in a C reorganization as long as 80 percent of the 
target's assets are acquired solely for voting stoCk.129 One 
drawback to taxpayers who obtain benefits under Section 
368(a)(2)(B) is that they must relinquish the benefit of the 
anti-Hendler language contained in Section 368(a)(1)(C).13o 
Thus, if boot is used in a C reorganization, then any liabilities 
assumed by the acquiring corporation are treated as boot for 
the purposes of the boot relaxation rule of Section 
368(a)(2)(C).13l 
One of the pitfalls inherent in the C reorganization arises 
when the solely for voting stock requirement is applied to an 
acquiring corporation which had previously purchased stock in 
the target corporation. 132 Assuming that the acqUlnng 
corporation's stock ownership falls short of control,l33 an im-
mediate liquidation of the target following the assets acquisi-
tion may invite the application of the step transaction doc-
trine. 134 The step transaction doctrine would then 
recharacterize a portion of the acquisition as an exchange for 
the target's stock.135 As a result, the acquiring corporation 
may not be able to meet the solely for voting stock require-
ment. 136 To avoid this problem, the acquiring corporation may 
liabilities assumed by the acquiring corporation. See id. 
128. See BITIKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 11-53, 11-54. 
129. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 219. 
130. ld. 
131. ld. 
132. CEB, supra note 2, at 96. 
133. So that an I.R.C. § 332 tax-free liquidation is unavailable. ld. 
134. ld. 
135. ld. 
136. See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). In that case, the acquiring corporation 
owned 79% of the target corporation's stock. See id. In order to obtain the assets 
of the target corporation, the acquiring corporation exchanged its voting stock for 
the target's assets. See id. The target then liquidated, distributing 79% of the 
acquiring corporation's stock back to the acquiring corporation and 21% of the 
stock to the target's minority shareholders. See id. 
The court held that this transaction failed to qualify as a tax-free C reorga-
nization because the acquiring corporation obtained 79% of the target's assets in 
exchange for its stock of the target and only 21% of the target's assets in ex-
change for its own voting stock. See id. Hence, the transaction was treated as a 
taxable liquidation rather than as a tax-free reorganization. See id. As corporate 
tax professors Abrams and Doernberg noted: 
While the court's holding arguably is consistent 
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have to sell the previously acquired stock before proceeding 
with the asset acquisition137 or to use a controlled subsidiary 
to make the acquisition. 138 
From a purely tax standpoint, a C reorganization is gener-
ally less attractive than an A reorganization due to the amount 
of both disclosed and hidden liabilities typically assumed in the 
acquisition of an ongoing business. 139 In a C reorganization, 
great difficulty lies in ensuring that the 20% boot exception to 
the "solely for voting stock" requirement is a sufficient cushion 
from disqualification. 140 However, from a nontax perspective, 
the use of a C reorganization may be advantageous. 141 For 
instance, it may not be possible to merge the target corporation 
into the acquiring corporation under applicable state or federal 
merger laws. 142 Also, unlike an A reorganization, a C reorga-
nization offers the acquiring corporation the ability to choose 
which of the target corporation's liabilities it will assume. 143 
Finally, only the target corporation shareholders may be enti-
tled to approval and appraisal rights, whereas both acquiring 
with the tenns of the statute, the "solely for vot-
ing stock" requirement seems intended to ensure 
that the target shareholders continue a proprietary 
interest in the continuing enterprise. The holding in 
Bausch & Lomb serves to invalidate a transaction 
when the acquiring corporation is itself a sub-
stantial shareholder of the target corporation, a 
situation in which the continuity of proprietary in-
terest is most evident. 
ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 220. 
137. Rev. Rul. 72-354, 1972-2 C.B. 188. 
138. See discussion of triangular reorganizations, infra notes 164-229 and ac-
companying text. 
139. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17. 
140. See id. Even if it appears that a tax planner knows the amount of liabil-
ities assumed or the boot involved, additional boot may be hidden in a number of 
places, such as contingent or escrowed stock arrangements, employment agree-
ments, and assumptions of shareholder-guaranteed debt. [d. The "substantially all" 
and liquidation requirements may present additional difficulties. Id. Moreover, 
unlike a merger, title to the target corporation's assets may be physically trans-
ferred to the acquiring corporation, a process which can be time-consuming and ex-
pensive. Id. 
141. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17. 
142. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-465, 1957-2 C.B. 250; George v. Commissioner, 26 
T.C. 396 (1956), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 5. This is especially true when the target corpo-
ration possesses a special charter, such as where the target corporation is a bank 
or an insurance company. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17. 
143. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17, A-18. 
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and target shareholders usually have these rights under Sec-
tion 368(a)(1)(A).144 
4. Nondivisive "D" Reorganizations 
A nondivisive "D" reorganization most closely resembles 
the C reorganization. l45 Both involve a transfer of "substan-
tially all" of a corporation's assets, followed by a complete liq-
uidation of the transferor .146 The two may be distinguished, 
however, by the statutory implementation of the continuity of 
proprietary interest doctrine. 147 In the C reorganization, con-
tinuity is ensured by the requirement that the transferee cor-
poration obtain the assets in exchange for the voting stock of 
itself or its parent. l48 In the nondivisive D reorganization, 
continuity is ensured by the requirement that the transferor or 
its shareholders have "control" of the transferee immediately 
after the exchange. 149 
Nondivisive D reorganizations are primarily used by the 
Service and the courts to control reincorporation abuses. 150 
The nondivisive D reorganization provides the Service with a 
statutory weapon to limit the use of a corporate liquidation, 
preceded or followed by a transfer of assets to a new or exist-
ing corporation, as a device to achieve unwarranted tax objec-
tives.151 Such a liquidation-reincorporation, if successful, 
could be significant because it would allow the following tax 
advantages: (1) a bailout of cash or property taxed as capital 
gains, (2) the generation of capital losses, (3) a stepped-up 
basis for depreciable property, (4) the elimination of the ordi-
nary income taint on Section 306 stock/52 and (5) the elimi-
144. Id. at A-lB. 
145. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. Where a transaction qualifies as both a C and a D reorganization, it is 
treated as a D. See l.R.C. Section 36B(a)(2)(A). 
150. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222. 
151. See id. at 223. 
152. Stock subject to the disabilities of § 306, called "tainted stock," is defined 
in § 306(c). ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 162. Any stock other than 
common stock distributed by a corporation is I.R.C. § 306 stock if received by the 
taxpayer tax-free under I.R.C. § 305(a). See id. The definition of § 306 stock also 
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nation of the earnings and profits account. 153 The sharehold-
ers could then use Section 351 to reincorporate without recog-
nition of gain. 1M However, it should be noted that the sub-
stantial repeal of the General Utilities doctrine155 by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 has reduced the incentives for a liquida-
tion-reincorporation.156 
To diminish the trouble that the Service had in meeting 
the 80% control definition, the Service uses the control defini-
tion of Section 304(c).157 The definition of "control" is relaxed 
in the case of nondivisive D reorganizations from the usual 
80% test down to the 50% test of the Section 304(c) anti-abuse 
provision.158 Because the taxpaying shareholders are in con-
trol of the new corporation after the transaction, the terms of 
the nondivisive D reorganization will have been met. 159 Ac-
includes stock received in a tax-free reorganization if receipt of the stock had the 
effect of a stock dividend. Id. A taxable disposition of § 306 stock generally will 
produce ordinary income to the transferor. Id. at 165. However, § 306 contains a 
number of exceptions to its strict rules; the relevant exception here being that § 
306 does not cover the disposition of § 306 stock as part of the complete liquida-
tion of a corporation. Id. at 167. Because the earnings and profits of a corporation 
are bailed out at capital gains rates in a complete liquidation, there is no reason 
to treat the disposition of the § 306 stock in this manner as an abusive bailout, 
unless the taxpayer was effecting a liquidation-reincorporation transaction. See id. 
153. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222-223. 
154. See id. at 223. 
155. The General Utilities doctrine arose from the 1935 Supreme Court decision 
in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), a case 
which shaped corporate taxation for over 50 years. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra 
note 12, at 90. Under the repealed General Utilities doctrine, a distributing corpo-
ration recognized no gain or loss on a distribution of property with respect to a 
shareholder's stock. Id. A corporation which distributed assets in kind in complete 
liquidation did not recognize any gain on the distribution. BNA, No. 770, supra 
note 83, at A-5. However, with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, although I.R.C. § 
311(a) still provides nonrecognition of gain or loss on a distribution with respect to 
stock, I.R.C. § 311(b) now provides that a distributing corporation must recognize 
gain on a distribution of property where the fair market value exceeds the a<ljust-
ed basis of the property. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 90-91. The 
gain will be recognized as if the property had been sold to the shareholders at 
fair market value. Id. at 91. 
156. See BNA, No. 770, supra note 83, at A-5. See supra note 155 for a discus-
sion of the effect of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 
157. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222. I.R.C. Section 304(c) de-
fines control as "the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total 
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 per-
cent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock." See § 304(c). 
158. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222. 
159. Id. at 223. 
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cordingly, no loss will be recognized at the corporate level/GO 
the corporation's earnings and profits account will not be elimi-
nated,161 and the shareholders will be prohibited from recog-
nizing any loss on the transaction. 162 Moreover, any cash re-
moved from the corporate solution will be taxable to the share-
holders. 163 
C. TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATIONS 
As contrasted with the typical two-party reorganizations, a 
"triangular" reorganization entails a reorganization between 
three parties. In a triangular reorganization, the consideration 
for the stock or assets of the target corporation includes stock 
of a parent corporation in control of the acquiring corpora-
tion.1M The transaction could be structured as a normal A, B, 
or C reorganization in which the controlling corporation ac-
quired the stock or assets of the acquired corporation in ex-
change for its own stock, followed by a distribution of the stock 
or assets to the controlling corporation's subsidiary under the 
"drop-down" provisions of Section 368(a)(2)(C).165 However, a 
triangular reorganization achieves the same result in a single 
step. 166 
A corporate acquirer may choose to effect a triangular 
reorganization to circumvent the Section 368(a)(2)(C) drop-
down provisions.167 An acquiring parent corporation may also 
wish to avoid an expensive and burdensome vote of its public 
160. See I.R.C. § 361(a)-(b). 
161. See I.R.C. §§ 381(a)(2), (c)(2). 
162. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 356(a). 
163. See I.R.C. § 356. Taxpaying shareholders have unsuccessfully tried to avoid 
the nondivisive D reorganization by reincorporating only a small portion of their 
assets. See Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981). 
164. BITl'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77, 12-78. 
165. P. WEIDENBRUCH, JR. AND K. BURKE, supra note 9, at 208. 
166. Sections 368(a)(1)(B) and 368(a)(1)(C) expressly permit a B or C reorganiza-
tion, respectively, to be structured as a direct acquisition of the acquired 
corporation's stock or assets in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring 
corporation's parent. In an A reorganization, two types of triangular structures are 
permitted under § 368(a)(2)(D) ("forward triangular reorganization") and § 
368(a)(2)(E) ("reverse triangular reorganization"), respectively. See P. WEIDENBRUCH, 
JR. AND K. BURKE, supra note 9, at 208-209. 
167. See BITl'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77. 
23
Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
564 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:541 
shareholders on the transaction. l68 Furthermore, an acquir-
ing corporation will normally seek a means to insulate itself 
from the target corporation's liabilities, both disclosed and 
undisclosed. 169 However, the acquiring corporation likely does 
not wish to give target shareholders shares of its subsidiary, 
which would create an unwanted minority interest. 17o More-
over, the target shareholders normally will want shares in the 
parent corporation rather than a typically unmarketable mi-
nority stock interest in the parent corporation's subsidiary.171 
Because the use of the drop-down provisions cannot achieve all 
of these objectives,172 the triangular merger alternatives are 
the most commonly used acquisition techniques. 173 
1. History of Triangular Reorganizations 
In two early Supreme Court cases, the Court held that 
triangular acquisitions failed to qualify as reorganizations 
because the shareholders of the target corporation did not have 
a continuity of interest in the target's assets due to the fact 
that they held stock of the parent corporation rather than that 
of the transferee corporation.174 These two cases, which estab-
lished the so-called Groman-Bashford doctrine,175 virtually 
barred triangular acquisitions from qualifying under the reor-
ganization provisions. 176 
168. [d. 
169. MARTIN D. GINSBURG, ESQ. AND JACK S. LEVIN, ESQ., MERGERS, ACQUISI-
TIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, at 8202 (vol. F5, 1993). 
170. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77. 
171. [d. 
172. Cook and Coalson, Jr., The "Substantially All of the Properties" Require-
ment in Triangular Reorganizations- A Current Review, 35 TAX LAW. 303, 313 n. 
39 (Winter 1982). For instance, if the target is merged into parent and parent 
then drops all of targets assets subject to all its liabilities, down to a wholly-
owned subsidiary, parent generally remains responsible for target's liabilities even 
after the drop-down. See id. 
173. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-79. 
174. Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302 
U.S. 454 (1938). 
175. The Groman-Bashford doctrine, which arose from two Supreme Court deci-
sions, Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) and Helvering v. Bashford, 
302 U.S. 454 (1938), prevented the use of triangular acquisitions. See BITTKER AND 
EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-240. The doctrine maintained that stock of the ac-
quiring corporations parent company did not carry the requisite continuity of inter-
est "genes." [d. 
176. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-240. 
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In 1954, the reorganization provisions were amended to 
allow the stock or assets received in an A, B, or C reorganiza-
tion to be distributed to a subsidiary of the acquiring corpora-
tion promptly after the exchange.177 Since 1954, the Code has 
allowed both B and C reorganizations to be accomplished by 
use of the voting stock of the parent corporation or its subsid-
iary, but not both.178 Subsequently, the Service published two 
landmark rulings in 1967179 which treated triangular merg-
ers as either B or C reorganizations, depending on whether 
subsidiary or target survived the merger, provided that the 
necessary voting stock requirements were met. 180 
Revenue Ruling 67-326 dealt with a prestatutory forward 
triangular merger involving a direct transfer of assets by the 
target corporation to the acquiring corporation's controlled 
subsidiary in exchange for stock of the parent.181 The Service 
held that such a transaction could not qualify for tax-free 
treatment as a Type A reorganization because the parent was 
not a party to the reorganization. 182 However, the Service 
ruled that the transaction could qualify for nonrecognition 
treatment as a Type C reorganization if the conditions of Sec-
tion 368(a)(1)(C) were met. l83 
Similarly, Revenue Ruling 67-448 involved a prestatutory 
reverse triangular merger.l84 In Revenue Ruling 67-448, the 
Service held that a reverse triangular merger qualified as a 
Type B reorganization where a parent corporation merged a 
newly created subsidiary into the acquired target corpora-
tion. l85 Thus, Revenue Rulings 67-326 and 67-448 laid the 
177. See I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(C). 
178. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 217, 221. 
179. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (transitory Subsidiary merges into Tar-
get in B reorganization); Rev. Rul. 67-326, 1967-2 C.B. 143 (merger of Target into 
Subsidiary for Parent stock qualifies as C reorganization). 
180. New York State Bar Association Tax Section [hereinafter "NYSBATS"), 
Comment, Report on Reverse Triangular Mergers and Basis-Nonrecognition Rules in 
Triangular Reorganizations, 36 TAX L. REV. 395, 397 (1981). 
181. Bl'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-44. 
182. ld. 
183. ld. 
184. ld. at 12-45. 
185. ld. 
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foundation for the codification of forward and reverse triangu-
lar reorganizations, respectively.186 
Not until 1969 did the Code allow triangular mergers to 
qualify as Type A reorganizations. 187 In 1969, Section 
368(a)(2)(D) was enacted to permit a "forward" triangular 
merger of target into subsidiary provided that the subsidiary 
use only the parent stock to acquire "substantially all" of the 
properties of the target. 188 The Code also required that the 
transaction would have qualified as a statutory A reorganiza-
tion had the target merged directly into the parent. 189 
In 1971, Section 368(a)(2)(E) was enacted to permit a "re-
verse" triangular merger. In a Section 368(a)(2)(E) transaction, 
the subsidiary merges into the target provided that, "in the 
transaction," the target's shareholders exchange for parent 
voting stock an amount of target stock which constitutes Sec-
tion 368(c) "control.,,190 These statutory changes acknowledge 
that a functionally identical tax result could have been 
achieved under prior law through a direct merger of the ac-
quired corporation into the parent, and through a Section 
368(a)(2)(C) drop-down of the acquired assets into one or more 
of the parent's controlled subsidiaries.19l Sections 368(a)(2)(D) 
and 368(a)(2)(E) do not, however, alter the definition of the 
type A reorganization. 192 These sections create a fourth and 
fifth category of acquisitive reorganization, incorporating ele-
ments of the type A, type B and type C patterns, while adding 
their own unique requirements. 193 
186. [d. 
187. BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77. 
188. NYSBATS, supra note 180, at 397-398. 
189. BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77. 
190. NYSBATS, supra note 180, at 398. I.R.C. Section 368(c) defines control as 
"the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting 
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total 
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." See § 368(c). 
191. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-78. 
192. [d. at 12-78, 12-79. 
193. [d. at 12-79. 
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2. Forward Triangular Reorganizations 
AI:. discussed,194 the standard two-party merger transac-
tion between the acquiring corporation and the target corpora-
tion may result in substantial nontax problems.195 First, the 
acquiring corporation becomes automatically liable for all the 
debts of the target corporation, including unknown or undis-
closed debts. 196 For example, there may be significant target 
liabilities such as environmental clean-up responsibilities, 
product liabilities, employee discrimination claims, anti-trust 
claims, asserted tax deficiencies, or other threatened or pend-
ing lawsuits.197 Also, the target corporation may have hidden 
liabilities, such as underfunded pension plans, burdensome 
long-term debt covenants, or labor problems.198 If the target 
is merged into the parent and the parent then drops all of 
target's assets, subject to all its liabilities, down to a wholly-
owned subsidiary, the parent would generally remain responsi-
ble for the target's liabilities even after the drop-down.199 
Second, the acquiring corporation and the target corpora-
tion must obtain shareholder approval to effectuate the trans-
action.2°O When the acquiring corporation is publicly-held, it 
may be expensive and troublesome to obtain the necessary 
approval of its shareholders.201 Finally, both corporations face 
possible exposure for dissenting shareholder claims.202 To 
avoid these problems, planners may use a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of the acquiring corporation to effect the forward trian-
gular merger. 203 
194. See supra notes 84-144 and accompanying text for prior discussion of the 
nontax problems inherent in a standard merger transaction. 
195. BNA, No. 770, supra note 83, at A-l44. 
196. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6, A-7. 
197. MARTIN D. GINSBURG, ESQ. AND JACK S. LEVIN, ESQ., MERGERS, ACQUISI-
TIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, at 8202 (vol. F5, 1993). 
198. [d. 
199. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 313, n. 39. 
200. For example, under California statute, Cal. Corp. Code § 1201 (1995), a 
merger reorganization must be approved by both corporations' shareholders. 
201. Thorne, supra note 90, at 38. 
202. GINSBURG AND LEVIN, supra note 169, at 8222. 
203. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 225. For instance, if the 
target corporation merges into a subsidiary of acquiring parent corporation, then 
approval of the subsidiary's shareholders is easy to obtain, because that approval 
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In the typical Section 368(a)(2)(D) forward triangular 
merger, the parent corporation forms a subsidiary, usually 
with nominal capitalization, and the target corporation is then 
merged into the surviving subsidiary. 2M In the merger, the 
former shareholders of the target receive the parent's stock, or 
other consideration in exchange for their target stock.205 The 
only limitation imposed on the consideration transferred to the 
target shareholders is that applicable to A reorganizations.206 
That is, a forward triangular merger qualifies for nonrecogni-
tion treatment only if: (1) the subsidiary acquires "substantial-
ly all" the target's properties, (2) it does not use any of its own 
stock in making the acquisition, and (3) the transaction would 
have qualified as an A reorganization if the target had merged 
directly into the parent corporation.207 This transaction is the 
A reorganization analog to the "parenthetical,,208 Band C re-
organizations.209 
3. Reverse Triangular Reorganizations 
Although the reverse triangular reorganization, codified in 
Section 368(a)(2)(E), has been part of the tax law since 1971, 
much uncertainty surrounded the tax treatment of this tech-
nique until the publication of regulations in 1985.210 Subse-
quently, in the late 1980's an unusually large number of letter 
rulings shed light on issues not dealt with by the 1985 regula-
tions.211 
is merely approval by the board of directors of the acquiring parent corporation. 
[d. 
204. Id. 
205. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 313. 
206. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 226. See § 368(a)(2)(D)(ii). 
207. CEB, supra note 2, at 97. 
208. A "parenthetical" B or C reorganization occurs when stock of the acquiring 
corporation's parent is used. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 217. 
209. [d. at 226. While the triangular merger Treasury Regulations do not spe-
cifically provide for the acquiring of a related corporation, there is nothing in the 
legislative history of the triangular merger provision to indicate that the section 
was not intended to apply where such is the case. See Rev. Rul. 77-428, 1977-2 
C.B. 118. 
210. Robert Willens, Flexibility of Reverse Mergers Increased by Regs. and Rul-
ings, 70 J.TAX'N 52 (Jan. 1989). See generally NYSBATS, supra note 180, discuss-
ing in 1981 the uncertainty surrounding 46 Fed. Reg. 112 (basis and nonrecogni-
tion rules), 114 (reverse triangular merger rules) (Jan. 2, 1981). 
211. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(j). 
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The reverse triangular merger format involves the same 
acquiring parent and the same target company as in the for-
ward triangular merger, but it is used in situations in which it 
is desirable for the target to survive the transaction and con-
tinue to hold its own properties.212 Such a situation could 
arise, for instance, where the target's shareholders are elderly 
and wish to benefit from a stepped-up basis for their stock at 
death.213 However, the reverse triangular configuration is 
usually dictated by important nontax considerations.214 For 
example, the target may hold a non-assignable franchise, fa-
vorable long-term lease, trademarks, or other valuable contract 
rights that cannot be transferred without third-party approv-
al.215 Alternatively, the target corporation may be the debtor 
under a loan agreement that triggers an acceleration of princi-
pal payments upon a substantial transfer of its assets.216 
Moreover, nontax state or federal regulatory requirements may 
require preservation of the existing corporate identity of tar-
get.217 As a result of these considerations, the reverse trian-
gular merger is commonly used in acquisitions involving 
banks, insurance companies, public utilities and other highly 
regulated industries.218 In order to accomplish the acquisi-
tion, a parent corporation forms a new subsidiary, which is 
merged into the target corporation.219 Under the merger 
agreement, the former target shareholders receive parent vot-
ing stock in exchange for their target stock and the parent be-
comes the sole shareholder of target.220 
Section 368(a)(2)(E) requires two important conditions for 
a reverse triangular merger to receive tax-free reorganization 
treatment: 
212. See MARTIN D. GINSBURG, ESQ. AND JACK S. LEVIN, ESQ., MERGERS, ACQUI-
SITIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, at 1003 (vol. F1, 1993). 
213. Id. 
214. See BNA, No. 770, supra note 83, at A-67. 
215. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. In addition, the existence of target corporation foreign branches or 
subsidiaries requiring foreign governmental approval for a change in the target 
corporation's control may warrant the use of a reverse triangular merger. 
GINSBURG AND LEVIN, supra note 169, at 8203. 
219. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 226. 
220. See id. 
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(1) Immediately after the transaction, the sur-
viving target corporation must hold "substantial-
ly all" of its assets and the assets of the merged 
subsidiary corporation, other than stock of the 
parent corporation distributed in the 
transaction. Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(3)(iii) 
reiterates that the term "substantially all" has 
the same meaning under Section 368(a)(2)(E) as 
in the C reorganization context.221 
(2) In the transaction, the shareholders of the 
target corporation must exchange target stock 
constituting "control" of the target corporation 
for parent voting stock. For this purpose, the 
two-pronged "control" definition of Section 368(c) 
applies: at least 80% of the total combined vot-
ing power of all voting stock; and at least 80% 
in number of the shares of all classes of nonvot-
ing stock. The Service interprets Section 368(c) 
as requiring at least 80% in number of each 
class of nonvoting stock.222 
Thus, a reverse triangular merger may qualify under Section 
368(a)(2)(E) even though some consideration other than parent 
voting stock223 passes from parent in exchange for target 
shares.224 However, the requirements of Section 368(a)(2)(E) 
are more restrictive than those that apply to a forward trian-
gular merger under Section 368(a)(2)(D).225 Thus, absent com-
221. The Service has ruled that the transfer constituting 90% of the target's net 
assets and 70% of the target's gross assets will constitute "substantially all." Rev. 
Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. See generally Cook and Coalson, Jr., The "Substan-
tially All of the Properties" Requirement in Triangular Reorganizations- A Current 
Review, 35 TAX LAw. 303 (1982). 
222. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.368-2(j)(3)(i), 1.368-2(j)(3)(ii) (1960). 
223. Up to 20 percent boot. See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(2)(E), 368(c). 
224. If the nonvoting stock consideration takes the form of cash or other prop-
erty, the recipients will be taxable under the reorganization boot rules of I.R.C. § 
356 or, if solely cash or other property is received, under the redemption rules of 
I.R.C. § 302. See Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 CB 112; Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 CB 
118. 
225. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(D) does not require that parent stock be voting 
stock. Also, in a forward triangular merger the amount of cash or other nonstock 
consideration flowing from parent is constrained only by the nonstatutory "continu-
ity of interest" doctrine: at least 50% stock is required for advance ruling purpos-
es, but the courts have tolerated substantially lower percentages. See Section 3.02 
of Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568; John A. Nelson Co., 296 U.S. 374 (1935) 
(38%); Miller, 84 F.2d 415 (1936) (25%). 
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pelling nontax reasons for keeping the target corporation alive, 
the forward subsidiary merger is often the preferred vehicle for 
tax-free triangular mergers.226 
The voting stock requirement of the reverse triangular 
merger also differs from that of the B reorganization.227 If the 
acquiring corporation in a reverse triangular merger exchanges 
voting stock for control of the target, it can use any consider-
ation to acquire the remaining stock of the target.228 Howev-
er, because the acquiring corporation must "acquire" control of 
the target in the transaction, the possibility for a "creeping" re-
verse triangular merger is substantially restricted.229 
III. DISCUSSION: THE LACK OF A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE 
IN THE CURRENT AMALGAMATING 
REORGANIZATION DEFINITIONS 
The current amalgamating re.organization definitions are 
full of detailed and complex principles, seemingly varied with-
out rhyme or reason.230 For example, the Code disparately 
treats boot, continuity of interest, and the "substantially all" 
test.231 No tax policy justifies the Code's disparate treatment 
of these various forms of reorganization.232 
Regarding boot, the motivation behind the the differences 
in tax treatment of the following remains a mystery: (1) 50% 
boot in direct mergers233 and in forward triangular merg-
226. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. But see generally infra Section III-J enti-
tled "Taxable Forward Or Reverse Triangular Merger?" See also Los Angeles Coun-
ty Bar Association Section of Taxation, LA Bar Members Advocate Consistent 
Treatment For Taxable Mergers, TAX NOTES TODAY, (June 10, 1992) at 92 TNT 
120-33 [hereinafter "LACBAST"] (discussing the higher tax risks involved in failed 
forward triangular mergers). 
227. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 226. 
228. 1d. 
229. 1d. at 226-227. See infra Section III-A entitled "Creeping Reverse Triangu-
lar Mergers." 
230. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 233. 
231. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Article, A Suggested Alternative Approach to 
the Senate Finance Committee Staffs 1985 Proposals for Revising the Merger and 
Acquisition Provisions, 5 VA. TAX REV. 599, 624-625 (Spring 1986). 
232. 1d. 
233. See I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(A). 
31
Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
572 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:541 
ers,234 (2) 20% boot in reverse triangular mergers235 and in 
certain stock-for-asset acquisitions/36 and (3) no boot in stock 
for stock acquisitions.237 Similarly, the Code permits nonvot-
ing common or preferred stock to qualify for continuity of inter-
est purposes in direct mergers238 and in forward triangular 
mergers.Z39 However, the Code requires voting stock for conti-
nuity of interest purposes for: (1) stock-for-stock acquisitions 
under Section 368(a)(1)(B), (2) stock-for-asset acquisitions un-
der Section 368(a)(1)(C), and (3) reverse triangular mergers 
under Section 368(a)(2)(E).240 No justification apparently ex-
ists for these disparities.241 
From a tax policy perspective, it is peculiar that a "sub-
stantially all" test would be applied to a stock-for-asset reorga-
nizations,242 and to both forward and reverse triangular 
mergers,243 but not to a direct merger or a stock-for-stock ac-
quisition.244 As a result of the "substantially all" test, it is 
virtually impossible to spin-off45 a target's assets in a tax-
free transaction under Section 355 prior to effectuating an 
acquisitive reorganization under Sections 368(a)(1)(C), (2)(D), 
or (2)(E).246 However, it is possible to combine a target's pre-
acquisition spin-off with a later merger under Section 
368(a)(1)(A).247 This later merger may be accomplished by ei-
ther merging the distributing target into the acquiring 
234. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(2)(D). 
235. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(2)(E). 
236. See I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(C) 
237. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(1)(B). See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625. 
238. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(1)(A). 
239. See I.RC. Section 369(a)(2)(D). 
240. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625. 
241. [d. 
242. I.RC. Section 368(a)(1)(C). 
243. I.R.C. Sections 368(a)(2)(D) and (2)(E). 
244. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(B). See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625. 
245. A "spin-oft" involves the pro rata distribution by a corporation of stock of a 
subsidiary to the corporation's shareholders. Matthew M. McKenna and Kirsten 
Scblenger, How to meet the five tests spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups must pass to 
provide tax benefits, TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS, 35 TAX'N ACCTS 298 (May 1985). 
Because the distributee shareholders do not surrender anything in exchange for 
the stock, spin-offs resemble § 301 distributions. See id. 
246. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 626. See, e.g., Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal 
Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938). 
247. See Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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corporation248 or by merging the spun-off controlled corpora-
tion into the acquiring corporation.249 It is also possible to 
have a target spin-off unwanted assets in a Section 355 trans-
action prior to the acquisition of the distributing target by the 
acquiring corporation in a stock-for-stock reorganization under 
Section 368(a)(1)(B).250 
At a minimum, uniformity should exist regarding boot, 
continuity of interest, and "substantially all" requirements for 
each form of amalgamating reorganization.251 This lack of 
uniformity is especially evident within the triangular reorgani-
zation provisions.252 The remainder of this discussion will pri-
marily focus on the asymmetry in treatment of forward and re-
verse triangular mergers. 
A. CREEPING REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGERS 
Prior to the 1985 regulations, much uncertainty surround-
ed the tax treatment of creeping reverse triangular merg-
ers.253 It was unclear if such a reorganization was even per-
missible, although creeping reorganizations were allowed in 
forward triangular mergers.254 A creeping reverse triangular 
merger is an acquisition in which the parent corporation al-
ready owns more than 20% of the target stock and thus cannot 
acquire the requisite 80% in the merger.255 Tax practitioners 
believed that such transactions were permissible due to both 
the reverse triangular merger's B reorganization lineage, and 
Regulation Section 1.368-2(c), which allows creeping B reorga-
nizations.256 
248. ld. 
249. See Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125. 
250. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 626. See Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 
83; but cr. Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80 (no B reorganization where stock of 
spun-off corporation acquired in a purported B). 
251. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625-627. 
252. See S. REp. No. 91-1553, 91ST CONG., 20 SESS. AT 2 (1970). 
253. See Willens, supra note 210, at 52; see generally C. MACLEAN, CREEPING 
ACQUISITIONS, 21 TAX L. REV. 345 (1966). A creeping reverse triangular merger is 
an acquisition in which the parent corporation already owns more than 20% of the 
target stock and thus cannot acquire the requisite 80% in the merger. 
254. See Willens, supra note 210, at 52. 
255. ld. 
256. ld. Moreover, many tax practitioners read Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 C.B. 
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The 1985 regulations, however, clearly dispelled the notion 
that creeping reverse triangular mergers were permissible.257 
Indeed, Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(3)(i) stated that in such a 
transaction the target shareholders must surrender control258 
of the surviving corporation in exchange for voting stock of the 
controlling corporation.259 The amount of stock constituting 
control is measured immediately before the transaction.260 
Although the "immediately before" analysis invites step-trans-
action problems,261 Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(3)(i) states 
that redeemed stock is not treated as outstanding so long as 
the target furnishes the redemption.262 Thus, redemptions are 
not fatal to Section 368(a)(2)(E) treatment as long as the survi-
vor is not reimbursed, directly or indirectly, for redemption 
costS.263 
Perhaps compelled by the literal language of the statute, 
the disparate treatment of forward and reverse triangular 
mergers is nonetheless unwarranted because it ignores Section 
368's legislative purpose of eliminating the tax-incongruity of 
124, as suggesting that creeping control and § 368(a)(2)(E) were not incompatible. 
See ill. That ruling involved a reverse triangular merger that did not qualify un-
der (a)(2)(E) because stock of a "grandparent" corporation was used and, at the 
time of the merger, the merging subsidiary's parent (a first-tier sub) "already 
owned a controlling interest" in target. See id. The implication was that an 
(a)(2)(E) would be possible whenever the amount of stock obtained in the transac-
tion was sufficient to raise the parent's interest to the 80% control level, regard-
less of how much stock was conveyed in the merger. [d. The only transaction 
clearly barred from § 368 (a)(2)(E) was one in which a corporation already in 
control sought to increase its percentage of ownership. [d. 
257. 1d. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.368-2 (j)(3)(O and -2(j)(7), Examples (4) and (9). 
258. "Control" in this situation constitutes 80 percent. See I.R.C. § 368(c). 
259. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. 
260. [d. 
261. See generally Blanchard, Jr., The Effect of the Step-Transaction Doctrine on 
Reverse Subsidiary Mergers: An Analysis, 55 J.TAX'N 72 (Aug. 1981). 
262. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. 
263. [d. See also Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 CB 110, in which a contribution to a 
target's capital by its new owner, made to defray a loan incurred to fund a re-
demption, was found to be a disguised payment of boot. [d. 
In addition to redemption funds furnished by the target, the case law indi-
cates that significant pre-merger stripouts of excess liquid or nonoperating assets 
of target will not necessarily cause the "substantially all" requirement to be violat-
ed. See, e.g., Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981) (operating 
assets only 15% of total assets); Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 
(3rd Cir. 1980) (19%); American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970) 
(20%). 
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forward and reverse triangular mergers.264 Indeed, a 1970 
Congressional report stated that there is "no reason why a 
merger in one direction should be taxable, when the merger in 
the other direction, under identical circumstances, is tax-
free.,,265 Thus, the fact that a parent corporation already owns 
more than 20% of the target stock will not preclude nonrecog-
nition treatment in a forward triangular merger by itself.266 
Moreover, there appears to be no sound policy reason why the 
same circumstances should bar such treatment in reverse 
triangular mergers.267 
Furthermore, application of the anti-creeping control rule 
to reverse triangular mergers is peculiar given the historical 
tie268 between Section 368 (a)(2)(E) and the B reorganization, 
where creeping control is clearly allowed.269 One possible ob-
jection to creeping control could arise from a concern that a 
creeping reorganization would allow a majority shareholder to 
substitute a larger asset basis in the target for the parent 
corporation's old stock basis.270 However, the same result oc-
curs when the parent owns no more than 20% of the target's 
stock prior to the reorganization.271 Surely no overriding leg-
islative hostility is the cause of the disallowance of creeping 
reverse triangular reorganizations since creeping reorganiza-
tions are also permitted by Sections 368(a)(1)(A) and 
368(a)(2)(D).272 
264. See Rev. Rul. 77-428, 1977-2 CB 118 ("The Committee Reports ... indi-
cate that I.R.C. Section 368 (a)(2)(E) . . . was enacted to allow as a tax-free reor-
ganization a transaction identical to a transaction described in Section 368 
(a)(2)(D) except the surviving corporation was the acquired rather than the acquir-
ing corporation."). 
265. S. REP. No. 91-1553, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS. AT 2 (1970). 
266. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
267. [d. 
268. This historical tie is through Rev. Rul. 67-448. See infra section III-I enti-
tled "The Availability of Revenue Ruling 67-448 as an Alternate Theory For Non-
recognition Treatment" for a discussion of Rev. Rul. 67-448. 
269. Beller, supra note 65, at 80. I.R.C. Section 368 (a)(l)(B) requires that the 
parent corporation control the target corporation "immediately after the acquisi-
tion, ... (whether or not such parent had control immediately before the acquisi-
tion)." [d. 
270. NYSBATS, supra note 180, at 400. 
271. [d. 
272. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
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B. AsSET "PuSH-UPS" AND "DROP-DoWNS" 
As previously discussed in Section II.C.3.,273 there are a 
number of nontax reasons which make reverse triangular 
mergers desirable. 274 One such nontax reason occurs when 
the target holds valuable contracts or maintains favorable 
banking relationships that make it desirable for the parent to 
keep the target in existence.275 However, after the reverse tri-
angular merger has taken place, the parent corporation may 
decide that it is best to conduct business as a single entity.276 
An upstream merger, or "push-up," of the acquired corporation 
into the parent will then allow an enterprise to conduct itself 
as a single entity.277 
Until recently, the Service employed the step-transaction 
doctrine to collapse the reverse triangular and upstream merg-
ers into one transaction arguing that the surviving corporation 
no longer "holds" its properties as required by Section 
368(a)(2)(E).278 At the same time, however, the Service al-
lowed push-ups after forward triangular mergers because Sec-
tion 368(a)(2)(D) merely requires that the subsidiary "acquires" 
substantially all the target's properties.279 However, in Letter 
Ruling 94-20-027, the Service undertook a more reasonable 
analysis of these transactions.28o The Service held that the 
273. See supra notes 210-229 and accompanying text for prior discussion of the 
nontax problems inherent in a reverse triangular merger transaction. 
274. See Emory, Swenson, Lerner and Fuller, Later Merger of Target Into Par-
ent Was Single A Reorganization, 81 J.TAX'N 116, at 117 (Aug. 1994). 
275. Id. 
276. See id. 
277. See id. 
278. See id. The Service would then test the transaction as a C reorganization, 
but the arrangement often failed to qualify. Id. If consideration other than voting 
stock of the parent corporation was used, or if the parent had a prior interest in 
the target, disqualification as a C could result from the Bausch and Lomb doctrine 
(See infra section III-F entitled "The Bausch and Lomb Problem" for an analysis of 
the Bausch and Lomb doctrine). Id. The transaction would be a taxable purchase 
of the target's assets, with that corporation recognizing corporate-level gain. Id. 
The parent corporation would take a stepped-up (or stepped-down) basis in the 
acquired assets. Id. Thus, what began as a qualifying reverse triangular merger 
would change, by virtue of the later upstream merger, into a failed C reorganiza-
tion. Id. 
279. See Emory, Swenson, Lerner and Fuller, supra note 274, at 117_ 
280. Id. A more reasonable analysis would be to treat the parent as acquiring 
the target assets directly in exchange for its stock. Id. Under this approach, the 
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later upstream merger would be stepped into the prior reverse 
triangular merger, even though it was decided to effect the up-
stream merger after the subsidiary was merged into the tar-
get.281 Thus, the parent was treated as acquiring the target's 
assets directly in exchange for its stock.282 
Another important nontax reason which makes triangular 
mergers attractive is their ability to shelter the acquiring par-
ent corporation from any undesirable target liabilities.283 This 
benefit is especially attractive when the target's assets are 
subject to unknown or undisclosed liabilities.284 For example, 
a parent may merge with a target in a C reorganization and 
drop all of the target's assets, subject to all its liabilities, down 
into a wholly-owned subsidiary. In such a situation, the parent 
generally would remain responsible for a target's liabilities 
even after the drop-down.285 To avoid this problem, planners 
use a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation to 
effect a triangular merger. 286 
Proposed Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(4) would have pro-
vided that a significant post-merger transfer of assets by a 
target to a controlled subsidiary, even though allowed by Sec-
tion 368 (a)(2)(C), would fail to satisfy the "substantially all" 
requirement of a reverse triangular merger.287 Many practi-
tioners found this proposal unjustified, since the Service per-
mitted a Section 368(a)(2)(C) drop-down following a forward 
triangular merger.288 In 1985, however, Final Regulation Sec-
tion 1.368-2(j)(4) reconsidered asset drop-downs.289 The Regu-
lation stated that an otherwise qualifying Section 368(a)(2)(E) 
transaction would be a good statutory merger of the target into the parent, under 
§ 368 (a)(1)(A). [d. at 118. When analyzed as an A reorganization, the existence of 
consideration other than voting stock would not defeat the transaction and there 
would be no Bausch and Lomb problem as a result of the parent's prior ownership 
of target stock. See id. (discussing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-20-027)(Feb. 18, 1994). 
281. See Emory, Swenson, Lerner and Fuller, supra note 274, at 118. 
282. [d. 
283. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 313 n.39. 
284. [d. 
285. [d. 
286. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 225. 
287. Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
288. See Rev. Rul. 72-576, 1972-2 CB 217. 
289. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(j)(4) (1960). 
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will not fail "merely because . . . part or all of the assets of the 
surviving corporation. .. or the merged corporation.. are 
transferred to a corporation controlled by the controlling corpo-
ration .... "290 Tax attorney Herbert N. Beller, in an article 
submitted to The Journal of Taxation,291 asserted: 
[w]hile the obvious intention here was to de-
scribe the "dropdown" case, the language used 
[in Reg. 1.368-2(j)(4)] describes instead a hori-
zontal or "brother-sister" transfer of assets be-
tween two controlled subsidiaries of P. The ref-
erence to "the controlling corporation" is an 
error; it should have read "the surviving corpo-
ration."292 
The described brother-sister transfer is not protected by Sec-
tion 368(a)(2)(C) because that provision requires direct control 
of the transferee corporation by the transferor corporation.293 
C. CONSEQUENCES OF A PARENT'S AsSUMPTION OF A TARGET'S 
LIABILITIES 
Until the regulations of 1985, tax practitioners were con-
cerned that an assumption of target's liabilities by a parent 
might somehow trigger taxable boot consequences to a target 
or its former shareholders in an otherwise qualifying reverse 
triangular merger.294 However, most practitioners believed 
that liability assumption was a relatively safe maneuver in 
light of Revenue Ruling 73_257.295 Revenue Ruling 73-257 
stated that a parent's assumption of a target's liabilities in a 
290. [d. The Service maintains that a drop-down of target stock or assets to a 
partnership will destroy continuity of interest if the transfer takes place as part of 
the plan of reorganization, unless sufficient target stock or assets are retained at 
the acquiror level. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-43 , A-44. Such a drop-down 
could invalidate the prior reorganization, regardless of the extent of the parent's 
interest in the partnership. [d. See GEN. COUNS. MEM. 35,117 (November 15, 
1972); see also GEN. COUNS. MEM. 39,150 (Mar. 1, 1984). 
291. Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
292. [d. n.41. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. 
295. Rev. Rul. 73-257, 1973-1 CB 189. 
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forward triangular merger transaction was protected under 
Section 357(a), and therefore, that liability assumption did not 
trigger taxable boot consequences.296 
Fortunately, Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(5) affirmed this 
interpretation by permitting the parent corporation to assume 
the target's liabilities.297 The Service now treats the assump-
tion as a contribution to the target's capital by the parent.298 
The parent's basis in the target's stock will then be increased 
by the amount of the deemed contribution to capitaP99 More-
over, a contemporaneous exchange of target debt securities for 
debt securities of the parent, or other securities of the target, 
will not prevent qualification under Section 368(a)(2)(E) and 
will be governed by the nonrecognition provisions of Sections 
354 and 356.300 Thus, taxable boot consequences will result 
only where the principal amount of the securities received ex-
ceeds that of the securities surrendered.30I Similarly, if the 
target issues a debenture or other debt security to the parent 
corporation for cash, the transaction will be considered sepa-
rate.302 Indeed, such a transaction will not affect qualification 
of the reverse triangular merger.303 Therefore, this regulation 
represents a radical departure from B reorganization prece-
dent.304 
D. THE "EARNINGS AND PROFITS" PROBLEM AFTER 
COMMISSIONER V. CLARK 
When property is sold or exchanged, the Code generally 
treats any resulting gain as capital gain, whereas gain from 
the receipt of a dividend is normally treated as ordinary in-
296. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
297. See id. 
298. See id. 
299. See Treas. Reg. § 1.118-l. 
300. Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
30l. [d. See Rev. Rul. 79-155, 1979-1 CB 153 (dealing with I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) in 
an I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(0) reorganization context). 
302. [d. 
303. [d. Cf Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1 CB 106 (same result in the B reorganiza-
tion context). 
304. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. Regarding B reorganizations, Revenue Rul-
ing 69-142, 1969-1 CB 107, views a securities exchange separately from the reor-
ganization, and therefore such transactions are taxable. [d. 
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come.305 Under Code Section 354(a)(1), however, gain from a 
stock-for-stock exchange pursuant to a plan of reorganization 
is not recognized in determining tax liability.30G If the ex-
change of stock in the reorganization is not solely for stock and 
securities, but also includes boot, Section 356(a)(1) provides 
that gain shall be recognized in an amount not in excess of the 
fair market value of the property or the sum of money.307 
Section 356(a)(2) controlls whether the gain is given capital 
gain treatment (as exchanges of property generally are) or 
ordinary income treatment.30S Code Section 356(a)(2) provides 
that, if the exchange has "the effect of the distribution of a 
dividend,» the gain should be treated as a dividend and taxed 
as ordinary income.309 Otherwise, the gain would be char-
acterized as gain from the exchange of property and taxed as 
capital gains.3lO 
In Commissioner v. Clark,3ll the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the payment of boot as part of a forward triangu-
lar merger had the "effect of a dividend" under Code Section 
356(a)(2).312 The Court held that one should assume that a 
pure stock-for-stock exchange followed by a post-reorganization 
redemption of a portion of the stock had occurred.313 In Clark, 
the shareholder transferred 100 percent of the stock of the ac-
quired corporation in a qualifying forward triangular reorgani-
zation for one percent of the stock of the acquiring corporation 
and cash.314 The Court rejected the Service's position that the 
receipt of the cash payment should be analyzed as if it were 
305. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 729 (1989). 
306. I.R.C. Section 354(a)(1). 
307. I.R.C. Section 356(a)(1). 
308. I.R.C. Section 356(a)(2). Section 356(a)(2) specifies that if an "exchange . . . 
has the effect of the distribution of a dividend," the boot must be treated as a 
dividend and is therefore appropriately taxed as ordinary income. 
309. See id. The safe-harbor provision of Section 302(b)(2) provides that a dis-
tribution in redemption of stock will not be treated as a dividend if it is "substan-
tially disproportionate." I.R.C. Section 302(b)(2). This means that the shareholder 
retained less than 80 percent of the voting and common stock of the corporation 
after the redemption as said shareholder owned before the redemption. See I.R.C. 
Section 302(c). 
310. See I.R.C. Section 356(a)(2). 
311. 489 U.S. 726 (1989). 
312. [d. at 728-729. 
313. [d. at 739-740. 
314. [d. at 731-732. 
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received immediately prior to the reorganization, which would 
have resulted in the receipt being taxed as a dividend.315 In-
stead, the Court adopted the taxpayer's position that the re-
ceipt should be analyzed immediately after the reorganization, 
as if the taxpayer had received solely stock in the reorganiza-
tion and the acquiring corporation had redeemed some of the 
stock for cash.316 Under this analysis, the receipt of the cash 
was taxed as a capital gain.317 
Before the Clark decision, amalgamating reorganizations 
in which the distributee-shareholder did not control both the 
transferor and transferee corporations were relatively 
clear.3lB Only the earnings and profits of the transferor corpo-
ration were used to measure dividend income under Section 
356(a)(2).319 Unfortunately, the Clark court considered only 
whether the receipt of property other than stock or securities 
as part of a forward triangular merger had the effect of a divi-
dend distribution.320 Since the Supreme Court concluded the 
receipt of property did not have the effect of a dividend distri-
bution, the Court did not address whose earnings and profits 
should be used to measure the amount of a dividend distribu-
tion.321 This failure has created uncertainty.322 This current 
uncertainty over whose earnings and profits should provide the 
benchmark for distribution has been exacerbated by the 
Service's inconsistent Letter Rulings issued after Clark.323 
315. Id. at 739. The dividend would have been taxed in proportion to the 
shareholder's stock holdings. Id. 
316. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739. 
317. Id. at 740. 
318. See Stewart and Fortin, The Correct E&P for Measuring Sec. 356(a)(2) 
Dividend Income, 24 TAX ADVISER 404, 408 (July 1993). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 409. 
321. Id. 
322. See generally id. See also infra note 323 for a brief discussion of this un-
certainty. 
323. Id. at 411. For instance, private Letter Rulings 91-18-004 and 91-27-023 
both involved § 368(a)(1)(D) acquisitive reorganizations and held that gains recog-
nized by the transferor shareholders would be treated as a dividend under § 
356(a)(2) to the extent of the combined Earnings and Profits of both the transferee 
and transferor corporations. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 91-18-004 (Jan 30, 1991) and 91-27-
023 (Mar. 4, 1991). See Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 CB 81; see also J. E. Davant, 
366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966). However, private Letter Rulings 91-12-026 and 91-
43-082, which also dealt with acquisitive § 368(a)(1)(D) reorganizations, held, for 
no apparent reason, that only the transferor's Earnings and Profits would be used 
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Under the post-reorganization rationale of Clark, only the 
parent's earnings and profits would be available to measure 
the amount, if any, of dividend income in a triangular merg-
er.324 The Service, however, could argue that Section 
304(a)325 applies to reach the earnings and profits of both the 
parent and target corporations by asserting that the subsidiary 
accomplishes the redemption of the parent's stock.326 Of 
course, the application of Section 304(a) will have no effect if a 
new subsidiary is the transferee in a forward triangular merg-
er.327 However, it could be problematic in a reverse triangular 
merger or where an existing subsidiary with earnings and 
profits is used in the forward triangular merger.32S 
In a Letter Rulin~29 involving a reverse triangular merg-
er,330 the Service used the parent's earnings and profits to 
measure the potential Section 356(a)(2) dividend income.331 
The most likely explanation for this ruling entails the Service's 
application of a "post-reorganization redemption" analysis to 
determine whose earnings and profits should be used.332 In 
doing so, the Service reasoned that the parent's stock is hypo-
thetically being redeemed, and therefore, the parent's earnings 
and profits should be the benchmark to determine dividend 
income.333 
in determining the amount of dividend income to the transferor's shareholders. 
Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 91-12-026 (Dec. 27, 1990) and 91-43-082 (Aug. 5, 1991). Since all 
four Letter Rulings were issued after Clark, it seems some confusion exists within 
the Service in regard to how the Clark decision affects the determination of whose 
Earnings and Profits should be used in a § 356(a)(2) boot distribution. [d.; Priv. 
Ltr. Ruls. 91-18-004 (Jan. 30, 1991) and 91-27-023 (Mar. 4, 1991). 
324. Stewart and Fortin, supra note 318, at 410. 
325. I.R.C. Section 304(a) provides for a redemption through the use of a relat-
ed corporation. I.R.C. Section 304(a). 
326. Stewart and Fortin, supra note 318, at 410. 
327. [d. In this situation, the new subsidiary will not yet have any earnings 
and profits. [d. 
328. [d. 
329. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-41-086 (July 19, 1990). 
330. See supra notes 210-229 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion 
of reverse triangular mergers. 
331. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-41-086 (July 19, 1990). Stewart and Fortin, supra note 
318, at 411. 
332. [d. 
333. Id. 
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E. REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGERS AND HOLDING COMPANY 
FORMATIONS 
There are two transactions available by which a widely-
held corporation with publicly traded debt securities may form 
a holding company.334 Such a corporation could utilize an ex-
change offer, in which the new holding company's stock and 
securities are exchanged for those of the existing entity.335 
Alternatively, the corporation could use a reverse triangular 
merger by creating two tiers of new corporations.336 There-
fore, the Section 368(a)(2)(E) transaction accomplishes econom-
ic results identical to that of the exchange offer. 337 
However, a reverse triangular merger is preferable be-
cause Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(5) affords various tax ad-
vantages.33S For example, a transferor-shareholder who only 
owns securities is not a member of the requisite "control 
group" of Section 351 since control under Section 351 is mea-
sured by stock, not security, ownership.339 Therefore, securi-
ties holders will be taxed on an exchange offer.340 However, if 
a Section 368 (a)(2)(E) occurs, the exchange of securities of the 
controlling corporation for those of the surviving corporation is 
governed by Section 354(a)(1).341 Where the debt instruments 
qualify as securities, nonrecognition treatment is available so 
long as the principal amount of the new securities does not 
exceed that of the 01d.342 Thus, changing the form of the hold-
ing company transaction drastically changes the taxation of 
participating debenture holders.343 
A second benefit of using reverse triangular mergers in 
holding company formation involves the impact of the original 
334. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. 
335. [d. 
336. [d. 
337. [d. 
338. [d. 
339. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. 
340. [d. 
341. [d. at 53. 
342. [d. 
343. [d. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-17-086 (Feb. 5, 1988) (illustrating the use of § 
351 in a holding company situation). 
43
Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
584 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:541 
issue discount rules.344 By using reverse triangular mergers 
instead of exchange offers, the corporation can avoid the eco-
nomic and bookkeeping problems that accompany original 
issue discounts.345 Thus, a reverse triangular merger offers at 
least two advantages when forming a holding company: tax-
free exchange treatment for debenture holders, and avoidance 
of original issue discount problems.346 Additionally, share-
holders are not disadvantaged by the use of a reverse trian-
gular merger in holding company formation. 347 
F. THE BAUSCH AND LOMB PROBLEM 
In 1959, the Second Circuit decided Bausch & Lomb Opti-
cal Co. v. Commissioner.348 In Bausch & Lomb, the Second 
Circuit held that an acquisition did not qualify as a type C 
reorganization when the parent previously owned 80 percent of 
the target's stock as a result of a prior transaction.349 In do-
ing so, the court decided that the "solely for voting stock" re-
quirement of the type C reorganization was not satisfied.350 
The court so held because a substantial portion of the assets 
were not acquired for stock of the parent but rather in ex-
change for the target stock already owned by the parent.351 
The Bausch & Lomb issue should not be problematic in 
the context of a forward triangular merger where there are no 
substantial restrictions on the consideration which may be 
used in the transaction.352 However, preexisting ownership of 
part of the target's stock will present a significant problem to 
the parent in the reverse triangular merger context.353 Before 
the regulations of 1985, the issue was whether the stock of the 
344. Willens, supra note 210, at 53 (referencing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-30-050 (May 
3, 1988). 
345. [d. 
346. [d. 
347. [d. 
348. 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1935). See supra note 
136 for a prior analysis of the Bausch & Lomb decision. 
349. [d. at 78. 
350. [d. 
351. [d. 
352. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 335. 
353. [d. at 336. 
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target exchanged by the other target shareholders must itself 
constitute control of target as defined in Section 368(c), or 
whether the requirement would be satisfied so long as the sum 
of that stock plus the stock previously owned by parent consti-
tuted contro1.354 Unfortunately for taxpayers, the regulations 
under Section 368(a)(2)(E) have adopted the former, more 
restrictive view. 355 
G. THE ABSENCE OF A "RELATIVE SIZE" LIMITATION IN 
REORGANIZATIONS 
An interesting relationship exists between reorganizations 
and Section 351.356 Under Section 351, the transferor must be 
in "control,,357 of the transferee corporation to receive nonrec-
ognition treatment.35S For example, if the owner of a "mom & 
pop" grocery store which is operated as a sole proprietorship 
transfers the business to a conglomerate in exchange for stock, 
the transaction is undoubtedly taxable.359 However, if the 
grocery store is organized as a corporation, the transfer of the 
stock or assets in exchange for the conglomerate's stock would 
clearly qualify as a tax-free reorganization.360 Thus, it ap-
pears that this operation of the reorganization provisions is 
inconsistent with Section 351.361 
It may appear reasonable to find that the reorganization 
provisions undermine the main purpose of Section 351 since 
these provisions extend nonrecognition treatment to certain 
354. [d. (analyzing the pre-19S5 proposed regulations). 
355. [d. 
356. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631. 
357. I.R.C. Section 351 defines "control" in terms of § 36S(c), which defines 
control as "the ownership of stock possessing at least SO percent of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least SO percent 
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." 
35S. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631-632. 
359. [d. at 632. 
360. [d. 
361. [d. If the sole proprietor were to incorporate her grocery store for the 
purpose of immediately entering into a reorganization transaction, the Service 
would take the position that the incorporation and subsequent merger transaction 
should be subject to step-transaction doctrine and thus be treated as a taxable 
sale. Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1, CB 73; West Coast Marketing Corp. v. Commission-
er, 46 T.C. 32 (1966). 
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corporate acquisitions that otherwise would not be given such 
treatment.362 However, Section 351 may also be used to give 
nonrecognition treatment to shareholders of a target corpora-
tion in a merger transaction that does not, under current law, 
qualify as a reorganization.363 Although strong arguments 
have been advanced in favor of a relative size limitation,3M 
the apparent lack of abuse in the absence of such a limitation 
362. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 632-33. See supra notes 356-363 and 
accompanying text for a brief discussion of the seeming disparity between Sections 
351 and 368. 
363. [d. Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., stated: 
[d. at 633. 
For example, the acquiring corporation and a minori-
ty shareholder of the target (e.g., a fIfteen-percent 
shareholder) can form a new corporation with the 
acqwnng corporation contributing cash and the 
minority shareholder contributing target stock. The 
acquiring corporation might receive all of the com-
mon stock of the new corporation and the minority 
shareholder all of the preferred. The transaction 
on its face qualilles under section 351 and the mi-
nority shareholder receives nonrecognition treat-
ment. The new corporation then purchases for cash 
the eighty-five percent balance of the stock of the 
target. As a result, the acquiring corporation has 
acquired all of the common equity in the target for 
eighty-five percent cash and fIfteen percent stock, 
the minority shareholder has received nonrecogni-
tion treatment, and the majority shareholders have 
a taxable transaction. Further, the new corporation 
could make a section 338 election and step up the 
basis of the target's assets. 
364. [d. at 631. The House version of the bill that became the 1954 LR.C. 
contained a relative size limitation that would have extended tax-free treatment 
only to mergers involving corporations of the same relative size. [d. at 630. This 
provision did not become law, but the relative size rule that was contained in the 
1954 bill would have denied reorganization treatment to any transaction where the 
acquiror was more than four times larger than the target. [d. & n.138. Thus, this 
restriction would make it practically impossible for an acquiring corporation that 
had common stock which was worth more than fIve times the common stock of 
the target to acquire the target in a tax-free exchange in which the consideration 
paid was stock. [d. & n.138. 
The idea of limiting nonrecognition treatment where stock is involved was 
proposed in a more restrictive form by Jerome R. Hellerstein, who argued that 
nonrecognition treatment should not be available in any reorganization transaction 
where the target's shareholders receive "stock traded on an exchange or in the 
over-the-counter market if an adequate market exists for the sale of the stock 
received." Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254, 284 
(1957). See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 630-31 n.139. 
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makes adopting one appear unwarranted.365 Further, the rea-
soning employed by Professor Walter Blum against a relative 
size limitation is persuasive: 
[The absence of a relative size standard] must, I 
submit, rest on a policy to encourage (or not 
impede) particular types of corporate business 
rearrangements. In this light it is easy to dis-
pose of the point about the relative size of firms 
participating in the union. Would anyone advo-
cate that we adopt a broad policy of encouraging 
the union of two equal size companies but not 
two firms of radically different sizes?366 
Of course, Professor Blum's argument fails to address the ra-
tionale of a relative size limitation, which is to award nonrec-
ognition treatment to transactions that only involve a mere 
change in investment form, and not substance.367 There must 
be an equivalent continuity of interese68 in the new invest-
ment form to warrant nonrecognition treatment.369 If the ef-
fect of the merger is essentially a cashing out of the target 
corporation's investment, then taxable sale treatment would be 
more appropriate.370 Perhaps a middle ground approach 
would withhold any relative size limitations on reorganization 
treatment, but impose a limitation on permissible boot paid in 
a reorganization, determined by reference to the relative size of 
the corporations.371 
365. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631. 
366. Walter J. Blum, Corporate Acquisitions under the Income Tax: Another 
Approach, 50 TAXES 85, 100 (1972). 
367. See generally ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 37. 
368. For example, equivalent "risk" and "control." 
369. See CEB, supra note 2, at 92; see also ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra 
note 12, at 37. 
370. Id. 
371. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631. 
47
Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
588 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:541 
H. PERMISSIBLE BOOT LIMITATION 
If reorganization status does not require relative size, the 
amount of permissible booe72 consideration should be a func-
tion of the relative size of the target and the acquiring corpora-
tion.373 The smaller the target relative to the acquirer, the 
smaller the amount of permissible boot consideration.374 Pro-
fessor Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., proposed the following per-
missible boot standard: 
Relative Size of Target Permissible 
To Acquirer Boot 
Less than 1 to 20 10% 
Less than 1 to 10 20% 
Less than 1 to 5 30% 
More than 1 to 5 40% 
According to Professor Thompson, Jr., these amounts of per-
missible boot should be adequate to satisfy dissenters and 
other shareholders who desire to be cashed out.375 
The rationale behind this boot standard is that in order to 
receive the benefit of tax-free reorganization treatment, the 
transaction should represent a continuation by the target's 
shareholders of an equity interest in the combined venture.376 
Thus, the proportion of the consideration that consists of vot-
372. The term "boot" is not defined in the Code. Boot refers to cash or other 
nonpermitted property that triggers recognition when received in an otherwise tax-
free exchange. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 11-53, 11-54. For ex-
ample, boot may refer to consideration such as nonvoting stock, debt securities, 
cash or other property. Id. 
373. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631. 
374. Id. at 682. 
375. Id. The Permissible Boot chart above was derived from Thompson, Jr., 
supra note 231. It is noteworthy that in 1958 the American Law Institute suggest-
ed that the maximum amount of boot be 33.3% of the consideration paid for the 
target and that only fully participating stock qualify in determining whether the 
suggested 66.66% continuity of interest test was satisfied. See AMERICAN LAW 
INST., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS 
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, REPORT OF WORKING VIEWS, at 326 (1958); 
see generally Kringel, Preventing a Dissenting Shareholder From Destroying a Tax-
Free Reorganization, 31 J. TAX'N 138 (1969). Also, Walter Blum has recommended 
that the maximum amount of boot in a reorganization be 20%. See Blum, supra 
note 366, at 89-90. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 642 n.180. 
376. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 639, 642. 
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ing common stock should increase as the size of the target 
becomes smaller in relation to the acquiring corporation.377 
Professor Thompson, Jr. reasonably maintained that this stan-
dard would not add unwarranted complexity to the reorganiza-
tion definition and would be uniform among all forms of reor-
ganization.378 
I. THE AVAILABILITY OF REVENUE RULING 67-448 AS AN 
ALTERNATE THEORY FOR NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT 
If a tax-free spin-offl79 precedes an attempted reverse tri-
angular merger, Section 368(a)(2)(E) may not apply because 
the "substantially all" test would likely not be satisfied.380 If, 
however, the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 67_448381 survived 
the enactment of Section 368(a)(2)(E), the reorganization could 
qualify as a B reorganization.382 Therefore, Revenue Ruling 
67 -448 gives a corporation an alternate theory in favor of non-
recognition treatment.383 
In 1974, the Service published two Rulings involving 
transactions which failed to qualify under Section 368(a)(2)(E) 
because the subsidiary was not directly controlled by the par-
ent corporation. 3M The Rulings held, however, that these 
transactions did qualify as Section 368(a)(1)(B) reorganizations 
377. 1d. at 641. The size of the target and the acquiror would be determined by 
the relative fair market values of the outstanding voting common stock of both the 
target and the acquiring corporations. 1d. The boot limitation could be determined 
simply by referring to the percentage of the voting stock of the acquiring corpora-
tion that is held by the target's shareholders as a result of the reorganization. 1d. 
378. 1d. 
379. A "spin-off' involves the pro rata distribution by a corporation of stock of a 
subsidiary to the corporation's shareholders. See Matthew M. McKenna and 
Kirsten Schlenger, How to meet the five tests spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups must 
pass to provide tax benefits, TAXATION FOR AcCOUNTANTS, 35 TAX'N ACCTS 298 
(May 1985). Because the distributee shareholders do not surrender anything in ex-
change for the stock, spin-offs resemble § 301 distributions. 1d. 
380. Willens, supra note 210, at 54. 
381. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (transitory subsidiary merges into target 
in B reorganization). 
382. 1d. See also Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 CB 83 (demonstrating that a spin-off 
followed by a B reorganization is permissible, because there is no substantially all 
requirement in a B reorganization). 
383. Willens, supra note 210, at 54. 
384. Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 CB 124; Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 CB 125. 
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under the transitory merger theory of Revenue Ruling 67-
448.385 This suggests that Revenue Ruling 67-448 has re-
tained its vitality despite Section 368(a)(2)(E).386 Interesting-
ly, the Service has applied the same theory to permit nonrecog-
nition treatment through Section 351.387 
Moreover, Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(7), Examples (4) 
and (5), indicate that B reorganization treatment can ''back-
stop" a failed Section 368(a)(2)(E).388 Thus, a failure to satisfy 
the numerous details of a reverse triangular reorganization 
does not necessarily preclude tax-free reorganization treat-
ment.389 Accordingly, in this situation, the relative flexibility 
of the reverse triangular merger indicates that this transaction 
385. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. See also Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 CB 124; 
Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 CB 125. 
[d. 
386. Willens, supra note 210, at 54. 
387. Beller, supra note 65, at 80, reasoning that: 
One point of difference between characterizing [a 
reverse triangular merger] as a B reorganization or 
Section 351 exchange, as opposed to an (a)(2)(E) 
transaction, has to do with P's [parent's] basis in the 
T [target's] stock. In a B or Section 351 exchange, P 
takes a carryover basis in the T stock equal to the 
exchanging T shareholders' basis plus any gain rec-
ognized to such shareholders on the exchange. By 
contrast, in an (a)(2)(E), the Service now requires a 
"net asset" basis - that is, P's basis in the T stock 
is determined with reference to T's basis in its as-
sets less its liabilities. 
Given the right numbers, this difference in basis consequences may dictate 
deliberately structuring [a reverse triangular merger] to flunk Section 368(a)(2)(E) 
and qualify instead under Rev. Rul. 67-448. See generally Blanchard, Jr., The 
Effect of the Step-Transaction Doctrine on Reverse Subsidiary Mergers: An Analysis, 
55 J. TAX'N 72 (August 1981). 
388. Willens, supra note 210, at 54. Treasury Regulation § 1.368-2(j)(7), Exam-
ple (4), involves a creeping control situation, and Example (5) involves both a 
creeping control and a prior redemption of target stock using target funds. See 
Beller, supra note 65, at 80. In each, the 80% control requirement is not satisfied, 
but the statement is made that "if S is a transitory corporation, formed solely for 
purposes of effectuating the transaction, the transaction may qualify as a reorgani-
zation described in section 368(a)(I)(B) provided all of the applicable requirements 
are satisfied." (The word "solely" is not used in Example (5». [d. 
389. Beller, supra note 65, at 80. 
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will occupy a more prominent status among savvy tax practi-
tioners.39o 
J. TAXABLE FORWARD OR REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGER? 
The taxable391 reverse triangular merger is treated as a 
sale and purchase of target stock by the acquiring corpora-
tion.392 Unless a Section 338 election is made,393 a taxable 
reverse triangular merger will result in only one level of tax 
being levied on the target shareholders.394 In contrast, the 
Service treats taxable forward triangular mergers as a transfer 
of assets from the target to the subsidiary, followed by the 
liquidation of the target.395 Before the repeal of the General 
Utilities doctrine in 1986,396 this characterization was of little 
importance since a Section 337 election was available to avoid 
a corporate level tax.397 Mter the repeal, however, such 
treatment resulted in the effective imposition of both a corpo-
rate level and a shareholder level tax upon the owners of the 
target corporation.39B Thus, although the requirements of a 
forward triangular merger are easier to satisfy than those of a 
reverse triangular merger, the stakes are much higher.399 
Members of the Corporate Tax Committee of the Los An-
390. Willens, supra note 210, at 54. 
391. The term "taxable" is used to refer to triangular mergers which fail to 
qualify for nonrecognition treatment under I.R.C. Section 368 and are therefore 
subject to taxation. 
392. See Los Angeles County Bar Association Section of Taxation, L.A Bar 
Members Advocate Consistent Treatment For Taxable Mergers, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(June 10, 1992) at 92 TNT 120·33 [hereinafter "LACBAST"]. 
393. Under I.R.C. § 338, which replaced § 334(b)(2), a qualified purchase of 
target stock is now given independent economic significance from a subsequent 
liquidation of the target regardless of whether a § 338 election is made or deemed 
made. LACBAST, supra note 392. 
394. See LAC BAST, supra note 392. As a stock purchase, the basis of the tar-
get assets will not be affected as a result of the merger, unless the acquiring 
corporation makes a § 338 election. [d. This has been the rule since 1982 when 
Congress repealed the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine as codified in § 334(b)(2) and 
replaced it with § 338. [d. 
395. [d. 
396. See supra note 155 for a discussion of the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine. 
397. LAC BAST, supra note 392. 
398. [d. 
399. [d. 
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geles County Bar Association of Taxation4°O (hereinafter 
"Committee") argue that characterization of a taxable forward 
triangular merger as a sale of assets is "only a trap for the 
unwary and could easily be avoided by more sophisticated tax-
payers.,,401 The Committee maintains that the distinction be-
tween stock and asset acquisitions is "scarcely perceptible."402 
The Committee proposes an elective system that puts the par-
ticipants in control of the tax consequences of the merger, 
irrespective of which of the participants survives.403 
The Committee further recommends a policy which encour-
ages the availability of Section 368(a)(2)(D) reorganizations 
and avoids the current "trap" caused by the choice of which 
corporation is to survive the merger.404 Such a policy would 
treat a taxable merger as a taxable stock acquisition, followed 
by a deemed Section 332 liquidation if the assets end up di-
rectly in the acquiring corporation.405 This treatment of tax-
able mergers would result in a carryover basis of the target 
assets in the possession of the surviving corporation.406 
400. [d. 
401. [d. The Committee agrees with the commentator who reasoned: 
"Factually, the line between stock and asset acquisi-
tions is scarcely perceptible... If this distinction 
has become so blurred as to be scarcely percepti-
ble," it is appropriate to ask whether an elective 
system that puts the participants in control of the 
tax consequences of the merger, irrespective of 
which of the participants survives, might be appro-
priate. 
[d. (quoting G. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal For Mandatory 
Uniform Rules, 44 TAX LAw REv. 145 (1989». 
402. LACBAST, supra note 392. 
403. [d. 
404. [d. 
405. [d. In some situations, it may be preferable to make an election available 
to elect asset sale treatment. [d. This will result in a corporate level tax and a 
step-up in basis of the assets transferred to the corporation surviving the merger. 
[d. 
406. [d. 
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K. NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON BASIS ADJUSTMENT 
FOLLOWING A TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATION (APPLICABLE 
TO ALL TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATIONS ON OR AFI'ER DEC. 
23, 1994)407 
Congress has failed to provide explicit statutory rules 
concerning the adjustments, if any, to be made to a parent's 
basis in its subsidiary or target stock following a triangular 
reorganization.40B Further, Congress has not expressly provid-
ed that a subsidiary does not recognize gain on its exchange of 
parent stock for target assets or stock in a triangular reorgani-
zation.409 However, in December 1994 the Service did issue 
new proposed regulations which employ an "over-the-top mod-
el,,410 for determining a parent corporation's basis adjustment 
in a subsidiary stock as a result of a triangular reorganiza-
tion.41l 
An over-the-top model would produce a result that treats 
the transaction as if the parent had acquired the target's as-
sets or stock directly and then transferred the assets or stock 
to the subsidiary.412 The Service maintains that this model is 
appropriate for triangular reorganizations.413 First, the code 
expressly defines the basis results in a parent-drop reorganiza-
407. See Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury, Internal Revenue Service 
Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
and Public Hearing (CO-993-71J, Controlling Corporation's Basis Adjustment in Its 
Controlled Corporation's Stock Following a Triangular Reorganization, Issued Dec. 
22, 1994, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (Dec. 23, 1994), 59 FR 66280 (Dec. 1994) 
[hereinafter "Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury"]. 
408. Id. 
409. Id. These issues do not arise in a parent/drop reorganization because § 358 
applies to detennine parent's basis in subsidiary stock on parent's transfer of 
target's assets or stock to subsidiary, and § 1032 applies to parent's exchange of 
its own stock for target assets or stock. Id. 
410. Under that model, following a tax-free triangular reorganization, a control-
ling corporation would detennine its basis in the stock of its target or its acquisi-
tion subsidiary as if it had acquired that stock itself and then contributed it to its 
subsidiary. Id. 
411. See BNA Mgrnt. Briefing, Corporate Taxes - ABA Tax Section at March 
31 Hearing to Endorse Triangular Merger Proposal, (Mar. 30, 1995). The December 
1994 proposed Treasury Regulations replace a 1981 proposed rule on the same 
subject. Id. 
412. Id. 
413. rd. 
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tion.414 Tax policy is furthered, therefore, because cognate re-
organizations are treated similarly.415 Second, subsidiary 
stock owned by a parent can be perceived as a "surrogate" for 
the target assets or stock acquired by subsidiary in the reorga-
nization.416 Therefore a parent achieves neutrality between 
the sale of subsidiary stock and the sale by subsidiary of the 
assets or stock acquired in the reorganization. m 
Newly proposed Section 1.358-6(d) requires the basis in 
the parent's subsidiary or target stock be reduced by the fair 
market value of consideration not provided by the parent.418 
Additionally, the newly proposed regulations permit a net 
negative adjustment to the parent's historic basis in subsidiary 
only in consolidated group situations.419 In the consolidated 
context, the adjustment may mean that the parent experiences 
an excess loss account under Section 1.1502-19 in its subsid-
iary or target stock.420 In the nonconsolidated context, the 
proposed regulations preclude a net negative adjustment and 
do not cause a reduction to the parent's historic basis even if 
that reduction would not result in a negative basis.421 Thus, 
the new proposed regulations do not deter the use of an exist-
ing subsidiary in the reorganization because none of the 
parent's historic basis in its subsidiary stock is reduced.422 
New proposed Section 1.358-6(c)(2)(i) speaks to reverse 
triangular mergers, maintaining the general rule that a 
parent's basis in its target stock is adjusted as if the target's 
assets were acquired. However, if a parent receives less than 
all of the target's stock, the parent's basis in the target stock 
received is determined only with respect to an allocable portion 
414. See Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury, supra note 407. 
415. [d. 
416. [d. The Service asserts that I.R.C. § 362(b) principles should govern the 
acljustment to parent's basis in its subsidiary stock. [d. 
417. [d. 
418. [d. This includes any parent stock not provided by parent pursuant to the 
plan of reorganization. [d. 
419. [d. 
420. [d. See new Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-30, 59 FR 66280 (Dec. 1994). 
421. See Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury, supra note 407. 
422. [d. 
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of the basis determined under new proposed Section 1.368-
6(c)(2)(i).423 
Additionally, new proposed Section 1.358-6(c)(2)(iii) in-
cludes a special rule for situations when the transaction quali-
fies as both a reverse triangular merger and a stock acquisi-
tion under Section 368(a)(I)(B).424 This rule permits a parent 
to adjust its basis in its target stock based either on the 
target's asset basis or on the aggregate basis of the target 
stock surrendered in the transaction.425 To date, the general 
consensus among tax practitioners appears to be that the Ser-
vice is correct to follow the over-the-top mode1.426 
At an Internal Revenue Service hearing on March 31, 
1995, tax attorney Mark Yecies427 asserted that the new pro-
posal improves the 1981 proposal because it relies on a gener-
al, rather than a mechanical approach to the taxation of trian-
gular mergers.428 However, Mr. Yecies noted that a stock ba-
sis approach may be more appropriate than an over-the-top 
model for reverse triangular mergers.429 As for the newly pro-
posed regulations permitting taxpayers to choose between basis 
treatment if the transaction qualifies as both an (2)(E) and a 
(1)(B), Mr. Yecies asserted that the Service should consider 
this approach even in cases which qualify only under 
(1)(B).430 
Also presenting testimony at the March 31st hearing was 
tax attorney Reeves Westbrook,431 who opposed the regula-
tions.432 Mr. Westbrook argued that no statutory authority 
423. ld. 
424. ld. 
425. ld. 
426. See BNA Mgmt. Briefing, supra note 411. 
427. Mark Yecies is a tax attorney at Ernst & Young, Washington, who pre-
sented testimony to the I.R.S. advocating the implementation of the new proposed 
Treasury Regulations. ld. 
428. ld. 
429. See BNA Mgmt. Briefing, supra note 411. The stock basis approach is de-
scribed in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). ld. 
430. ld. 
431. Reeves Westbrook is a tax attorney at Covington & Burling, Washington, 
who presented testimony to the I.R.S. against the implementation of the new pro-
posed Treasury Regulations. ld. 
432. [d. 
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exists for determining basis in a forward triangular merger by 
constructing a hypothetical transitory step in which the assets 
of a target are deemed to be transferred to the parent.433 Mr. 
Westbrook maintained that "[t]his step is contrary both to the 
form and substance of a forward triangular reorganization ... 
is contrary to the history of the triangular reorganization pro-
visions, and is internally inconsistent with portions of the 
proposed regulations.,,434 Mr. Westbrook proposed that the 
Service should allow additional flexibility in determining a 
parent's basis in the stock of its subsidiary for periods begin-
ning before the effective date of the final regulations.435 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Under the current amalgamating reorganization rules and 
definitions, there remains an asymmetry in treatment of trian-
gular mergers. This disparate treatment is based primarily 
upon the distinction of whether the reorganization takes the 
form of a forward or reverse triangular merger. No justification 
exists for the unequal treatment of these economically cognate 
transactions. 
Since the issuance of the 1985 regulations, tax planning 
for reverse triangular mergers has certainly been more predict-
able. However, there remains a need for further clarification 
and unification of the Code. The legislative history of Section 
368(a)(2)(E) suggests that the section's primary purpose was to 
eliminate the tax-incongruity of forward and reverse triangular 
reorganizations. Indeed, a 1970 Congressional report argued 
there is "no reason why a merger in one direction should be 
taxable when the merger in the other direction, under identical 
circumstances, is tax-free.,,436 
Despite Congressional intent, the Service has been any-
thing but zealous to reconcile Sections 368(a)(2)(D) and (2)(E). 
In particular, the Service's current contentment with the anti-
creeping control rule in (2)(E) is unwarranted. The fact that a 
433. See BNA Mgmt. Briefing, supra note 411. 
434. Id. 
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436. S. REP'T No. 91-1553, 91ST CONG., 20 SESS. AT 2 (1970). 
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parent corporation already owns more than 20% of a target's 
stock will not alone preclude nonrecognition treatment in for-
ward triangulars. There appears to be no sound policy reason 
why the same circumstances should bar such treatment in 
reverse triangular mergers. While the Service has made some 
positive changes regarding asset push-ups and drop-downs, tax 
planners should still remain cautious. It can only be hoped 
that, in time, the reorganization provisions will attain a state 
of tax equipoise. 
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